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Understanding the Related-Key Security of
Feistel Ciphers from a Provable Perspective
Chun Guo
Abstract—We initiate the provable related-key security treat-
ment for models of practical Feistel ciphers. In detail, we consider
Feistel networks with four whitening keys wi(k), i = 0, 1, 2, 3,
and round-functions of the form f(γj(k) ⊕ X), where k is the
master-key, wi and γj are efficient transformations, and f is a
public ideal function or permutation accessible by the adversary.
We investigate key-schedule conditions that are sufficient for
security against XOR-induced related-key attacks up to 2n/2
adversarial queries. When the key-schedules are non-linear, we
prove security for 4 rounds. When only affine key-schedules are
used, we prove security for 6 rounds. These also imply secure
tweakable Feistel ciphers in the Random Oracle model.
By shuffling the key-schedules, our model unifies both the
DES-like structure (known as Feistel-2 scheme in the cryptan-
alytic community, a.k.a. key-alternating Feistel due to Lampe
and Seurin, FSE 2014) and the Lucifer-like model (previously
analyzed by Guo and Lin, TCC 2015). This allows us to derive
concrete implications on these two (more common) models, and
helps understanding their related-key security difference.
Index Terms—blockcipher, provable security, indistinguishabil-
ity, related-key, Feistel cipher, key-alternating paradigm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Feistel-like blockciphers consist of several iterative applica-
tions of a simple Feistel permutation
ΦGki (WL‖WR) = WR‖WL ⊕Gki(WR) (1)
for a keyed function G : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
on n-bit strings, yielding a 2n-bit blockcipher [1]. Such
ciphers and their generalizations constitute a half proportion
of modern blockciphers, including some most popular designs
such as DES [2], Lucifer [3], GOST [4], and NSA’s SIMON
family [5]. This has made it the object of a very large (and
still increasing) amount of analyses.
In information-theoretic model, the round-function G would
be assumed somewhat random. Without additional hard-
ness assumption, provable security is limited to at most 2n
queries [6], which is much smaller than 22n, the domain-
size of the Feistel ciphers. Despite this limitation as well as
the gap between the strong assumption on G and the weak
round-functions in practical ciphers, this approach excludes
any possibility of generic attacks and supplies insights into the
cipher structures. Therefore, it has found applications in both
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Feistel ciphers [7], [6], [8], [9], [10], [11] and their counterpart
Key-Alternating Ciphers (KACs) [12], [13], [14], [15].1
Related-Key Attacks (RKAs) were independently intro-
duced by Biham [16] and Knudsen [17] in early 1990s, and
was later formalized by Bellare and Kohno [18]. In this
setting, the adversary is allowed to query the blockcipher under
multiple secret keys that satisfy adversary-chosen relations.
The presence of such related-keys may be the consequence
of a protocol-level key update [19], or the user key being
tampered by fault injections [20]. The adversarial goal is to
either recover the secret key(s), or to distinguish the related-
key oracles from independent random permutations [18].
RKAs can be classified according to the adversary-chosen
relations between the keys. Likely, the most important cate-
gory is the so-called XOR-induced Related-Key Attack (⊕-
RKA) [21], i.e., RKA that allows the adversary to XOR any
constant of its choice to the secret user key. Such RKAs are
important for at least three reasons. First, they arise naturally
in a number of contexts, such as the f8 and f9 protocols of the
3GPP standard [19]. Second, from a theoretical point of view,
they are the simplest kind of attacks to have the completeness
property [22], namely, for any keys k, k′ ∈ {0, 1}n, there
exists ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n such that k ⊕∆ = k′.
Last—but most importantly,—⊕-RKAs are the most rele-
vant to cryptanalytic practice. Most practical ciphers mix the
keys into the state via the XOR operation. As commented
in [23], for such targets ⊕-RKAs are inherent to the majority
of differential-based attacks, as XOR key-relations leave the
chance of canceling the state difference with the (chosen)
round-key difference (this phenomena was named local colli-
sion [24]) and extending differentials without decreasing their
probabilities. Due to this, ⊕-RKAs have been the most widely
used attack model in symmetric cryptanalysis (as another
example, the powerful related-key boomerang and rectangle
attacks were in the ⊕-RKA form when firstly introduced [25]).
And they have given rise to a plenty of prominent results,
including very efficient (distinguishing) attacks on many Feis-
tel ciphers that will be mentioned in the next subsection, a
practical-time attack on the 3GPP encryption algorithm KA-
SUMI [26], and a forgery attack on 3-DES-based RMAC [27].
And their variants break full AES-192 and AES-256 [24]
and 10-round AES-256 in practical-time [28].2 The mentioned
attack on RMAC is also a notable example of RKA weakness
resulting in more disastrous attacks on high-level primitives,
showing that pursuing RKA security is not purely theoretical.
1KACs are blockciphers that alternatively apply key-additions and keyless
permutations, i.e., KACP1,...,Ptk0,k1,...,kt (M) = kt⊕Pt(. . . (k1⊕P1(k0⊕M))).
2These variants assumed XORing constants into the round-keys, and are
thus called related sub-key attacks.
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Our Question. With the above, ⊕-RKAs deserve special
attention on the theoretical side. Recall that such a provable
security requires that with a secret key k, the q blockcipher
instances Ek⊕∆1 , . . . ,Ek⊕∆q queried by the attacker with
distinct chosen constants ∆1, . . . ,∆q are indistinguishable
from q independent random permutations. Such security has
been established for KACs [21], [29] and their tweakable
variants [30]. It’s then natural to ask: under which conditions
could Feistel ciphers be provably secure against ⊕-RKAs?
In fact, to a large extent, our motivation also stems from
practice: certain structural features cause remarkable ⊕-RKA
weakness in a lot of Feistel ciphers in reality. The most well-
known example must be the complementation property in
DES [31], i.e. DESk(M) = DESk(M) where X is the bit-
by-bit complementation of X . This non-random behavior also
exists in its variants 3-DES [32] and DESL [33]. This not
only cinches efficient related-key distinguishers on DES, but
also reduces its effective key-length by 1 bit in the traditional
single-key attack setting. Although appearing harmless, it has
been long asked how to overcome [34]. Other marvelous
examples include ⊕-RKAs on GOST with very low complexity
described in [35] and [36], and very efficient distinguisher
on the SHA-3 candidate based on Lesamnta [37]. In all, it
appears that the components (e.g. key-schedules) of Feistel
ciphers have to be carefully designed in order to achieve RKA
security. This is sharply contrast to the KAC model, for which
even the simplest idea k⊕P (k⊕P (k⊕P (k⊕M))) already
buys some level of security (see [29]). A better understanding
of Feistel ciphers in the RKA setting is thus crucial.
We have noticed two works that partially addressed our
question. The first work of Barbosa and Farshim proved that
the famous Luby-Rackoff model with round-keys rightfully
reused is RKA secure [10]. Such models are Feistel networks
using a pseudorandom function (PRF) Gki as the round-
function [7], and have been extensively studied, with [6]
and [8] to name a few. Unfortunately, this model overlooks
many structural properties, e.g. the complementation property,
and this leaves a huge gap between model and reality. In
addition, it’s arguably too strong to model the round-function
as a PRF secure against RKAs—while the practice-motivated
model Gki(WR) = f(ki⊕WR) may be a PRF when f is not
too weak, it’s never an RKA-secure PRF. A comprehensive
discussion is given later in page 4. In all, in the RKA setting,
Luby-Rackoff results appear less convincing.
The second work of Guo and Lin proved that a Lucifer-
like Feistel structure (will be clarified later: see Eq. (3), or
Eq. (61) in Appendix A) could be indifferentiable from ideal
ciphers [38], which implies ⊕-RKA security by [29]. But their
extremely weak bound q30/2n appears meaningless.
With these considerations, we’d like to bridge theory and
reality: we’d like to find a model that could well capture the
structural features—including the known RKA weakness—
of practical Feistel ciphers, and then study under which
constraints the model could achieve ⊕-RKA security. Hope-
fully, this will serve invaluable insights, and help address
the challenge of designing RKA secure Feistel ciphers—and
further tweakable Feistel ciphers, as RKA-secure ciphers and
tweakable blockciphers [39] are strongly related [18].
A Unified Model for Feistel Ciphers in Reality. Practical
Feistel ciphers usually employ keyless transformations for
round-functions, and mix the keys into the structure via
efficient group operations (usually xor). In addition, whiten-
ing keys may be used. This naturally motivates modeling
the keyless round-functions as public (random) functions or
permutations fi, explicitly xoring the round-keys somewhere,
and eventually adding whitening keys.
In detail, we consider Feistel networks in which the state at
round i is updated according to
WL‖WR 7→WR‖WL ⊕ fi(ki ⊕WR), (2)
and four n-bit whitening keys (wk0, wk1, wk2, wk3) are used.
Among them, wk0‖wk1 is used as the pre-whitening key,
while wk2‖wk3 is the post-whitening key. Its special case
without whitening keys was named Key-Alternating Feistel
(KAF) by Lampe and Seurin [9]. Thus we name our model
Key-Alternating Feistel with Whitening keys (KAFw).
To be closer to the reality, we do not assume the components
independent. Instead, we assume: (i) all the round-functions
f1, . . . , ft are the same one denoted f , and (ii) each sub-
key is derived from an n-bit master-key k via an efficiently
computable n-to-n-bit transformation, i.e. ki = γi(k) for
i = 1, . . . , t, and wkj = wj(k) for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.3
Please see Fig. 1 for the instances with 4 and 6 rounds.
Denote by (w, γ) such a key-schedule function for t-rounds,
w = (w0, w1, w2, w3), γ = (γ1, . . . , γt); and denote by
KAFwf,(w,γ) the “single-function” KAFw model with round-
function f and key-schedule (w, γ).
On Other Models. We re-stress our model should be distin-
guished from the mentioned Luby-Rackoff model built upon
a PRF Gki(WR). In such a round-function the key is “em-
bedded” in a non-obvious way, and it thus overlooks many
structural properties in practical Feistel ciphers.
We did not notice any previous work on our KAFw model.4
However, by appropriately shuffling the key-schedule (w, γ) =
((w0, . . . , w3), (γ1, . . . , γt)), KAFw unifies existing famous
theoretical models, and captures the structures of a large range
of Feistel ciphers. To see this, we first note that (as mentioned)
by setting the whitening keys to 0, we recover the KAF model,
a.k.a. Feistel-2 schemes in the cryptanalytic community [41],
which has been deeply understood from the cryptanalysis point
of view [42], [36], [41] and frequently used as instructive
examples for illustrating new attacks [43]. The KAF model
roughly captures the structures of DES [2], GOST [4], and
Camellia variant without FL/FL−1 functions [36].
We then note that in the aforementioned Lucifer-like struc-
ture, each round-key is xored after the corresponding round-
function, i.e. the state at round i is updated according to
WL‖WR 7→WR‖WL ⊕ fi(WR)⊕ ki. (3)
3While n-bit master-keys may be uncommon in practice, it suffices for
serving some insights (as will be seen). To address longer master-keys, the
difficulty lies in modeling key-schedules: see the discussion in page 5.
4On the practical side, the cipher CLEFIA recommended by the ISO/IEC
standard [40] is a 4-line generalization of KAFw.
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This afterwards manner effectively eliminates the key interrup-
tion in the 1st round and in the last round and allows the ana-
lyst to analyze an equivalent two-round-reduced variant [44],
using the original 1st and last round-keys as whitening keys:
0‖k1 for pre-whitening, and kt‖0 for post-whitening (we
include a formal clarification in Appendix A). We denote
by KAFv the resulted whitening key-based KAF Variant.
Roughly, KAFv or the Lucifer-like model and their multi-line
generalizations capture Blowfish [45], TEA [46], XTEA [47],
SIMON [5], Piccolo (multi-line KAFv) [48], and RC2 [49].
Most importantly to us, each KAFv instance is also captured
by a KAFw instance with a corresponding key-schedule (a
formal analysis is given in section V-B). Therefore, our model
KAFw seems the most general.
By the above discussion, it seems the three models KAFw,
KAF, and KAFv are cryptographically equivalent modulo
different key-schedules. But this contradicts existing under-
standings. For example, it was commented that the Lucifer-
like structure blocks the complementation property, while in
KAF the first and last rounds are more effective [44]; and that
KAFv seems stronger against RKAs, which appears one of the
motivations to use it [37]. And, assuming independent random
round-functions and identical round-keys, the 21-round KAFv
variant is indifferentiable from ideal ciphers [50], while the
KAF variant is never indifferentiable [38] (even worse, such
KAF would collapse to a 1-round KAC built on a keyless
multi-round Feistel permutation! see page 6). As will be
unveiled in this paper, this distinction stems from the fact that
to achieve the same level of security, KAF and KAFv models
require different properties from the involved key-schedules;
and with common key-schedule designs, KAFv has a higher
chance of being secure against RKAs than KAF ! (For details
please see below.)
Our Contributions. We first focus on the KAFwf,(w,γ) model
and prove general results, and then derive concrete implica-
tions on the more popular KAF and KAFv models.
In detail, we analyze both the case of (w, γ) being (highly)
non-linear (with respect to ⊕) and the case of (w, γ) being
purely affine. In each case, (as mentioned) KAFwf,(w,γ) uses
identical round-functions and sub-keys derived from an n-bit
master-key. For the round-function f , we consider both f =
F a random n-to-n-bit function (denoted KAFwF,(w,γ)) and
f = P a random n-bit permutation (denoted KAFwP,(w,γ)—
distinguished by the superscript). The consideration here is
two-fold. First, both choices have been adopted in practice, e.g.
GOST uses a 32-bit permutation, while SIMON2n/κ uses an
n-to-n-bit non-bijective function. Second, both choices have
advantages: random functions are theoretically attractive since
they have less structural properties than random permutations,
while the latter allow practical instantiations using e.g. SHA-3
permutations [51] (will be discussed later).
In all, we analyzed four cases: KAFwF,(w,γ) and
KAFwP,(w,γ) with non-linear (w, γ), and KAFwF,(w,γ) and
KAFwP,(w,γ) with affine (w, γ). With non-linear (w, γ), our
main result states sufficient conditions on the key-schedule
so that the 4-round KAFwF,(w,γ) and KAFwP,(w,γ) ciphers
are secure against ⊕-RKAs up to O˜(2n/2) queries, where
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Figure 1. The KAFwf,(w,γ) cipher variants with notations (for the interme-
diate values) used in this paper. f is a public round-function—either a random
function F , or a random permutation P . (Left) 4-round KAFwf,(w,γ); (Right)
6-round KAFwf,(w,γ).
the O˜(·) notation hides factors that depend on (w, γ). Such
good key-schedules can be instantiated via field arithmetics.
For example, with the following key-schedule, the 4-round
KAFwF,(w,γ) and KAFwP,(w,γ) are secure up to c·2n/2 queries
for a small constant c (which is given in section VI):
• w0(k) = w3(k) = γ2(k) = γ3(k) = 0;
• w1(k) ⊕ γ1(k) = M1 ⊗ k ⊕ k3, and w2(k) ⊕ γ4(k) =
M4⊗k⊕k3, where M1 6= M4 are two non-zero constants
chosen from {0, 1}n, and ⊗ denotes multiplications taken
over the finite field F2n .
Interestingly, this means one could set γ1(k) = γ4(k) = 0,
i.e., the security of the 4-round Feistel cipher can be fully
based on carefully chosen pre- and post-whitening keys.
For any cipher with an n-bit master-key, an RKA adversary
could leverage collisions between secret related-keys and
offline guesses for distinguishing with 2n/2 queries [18]. Our
birthday bound is thus tight. The 4 rounds are also tight, as
otherwise a standard (i.e., non related-key), adaptive chosen-
plaintext and ciphertext attack (CCA) is possible (see e.g. [6]).
Without non-linearity, using a related-key boomerang [25]
distinguisher we break four rounds with any affine (w, γ), and
further using the boomerang switch trick [24] we break five
rounds under one more assumption on (w, γ). Our positive
result states conditions on the key-schedule that suffice for
2n/2 security of 6-round KAFwF,(w,γ) and KAFwP,(w,γ). The
(simple) conditions (roughly) prevent self-symmetry and com-
plementation properties. An example, which also highlights
the importance of the 1st and last round-keys, is as follows:
• w0(k) = w1(k) = w2(k) = w3(k) = 0, i.e., no
whitening keys;
• (γ1(k), γ2(k), γ3(k), γ4(k), γ5(k), γ6(k)) = (k, 0, 0, 0, 0,
pi(k)), where pi(kL‖kR) = kR‖kL ⊕ kR.
3
Note that this pi is a linear orthomorphism, i.e., a permutation
of {0, 1}n for which x 7→ x ⊕ pi(x) is also a permutation.
Orthomorphisms have been found helpful in establishing nice
theoretical results, in particular minimal Luby-Rackoff mod-
els [52] and 2-round KACs [53]. We remark that such a key-
schedule seems rather weak. Yet, it suffices for our birthday
provable security. Stronger key-schedules might help establish
beyond-birthday security, which is left for future work.
IMPLICATIONS ON KAF AND KAFv. From the general results
on KAFw we can derive positive results on 4- and 6-round
KAF and KAFv, and that which conditions on the key-
schedules suffice for security.
For non-linear key derivation functions (KDFs) our results
indicate they could increase the ⊕-RKA security of KAF. This
confirms the theoretical soundness of designs with highly non-
linear key-schedules, e.g. CAST-128 [54].5
For affine KDFs the situation is a bit complicated (and more
interesting). Roughly speaking, for KAF (and also KAFw)
ciphers, one should pay additional attention on the interaction
between the KDFs at the odd rounds and even rounds respec-
tively. On the other hand, for KAFv ciphers it (may) suffice to
just focus on designing each round-KDF, without considering
the interactions between different rounds. These explain the
different behaviors of KAF and KAFv structures, and serve
as theoretical evidence that with common ad hoc key-schedule
designs, KAFv variants do have a higher chance to achieve ⊕-
RKA security than KAF and KAFw. This confirms the theoreti-
cal soundness of reverting to KAFv structures to improve RKA
security, which—as mentioned,—seems a folklore [44], [37],
and seems the idea underlying many KAFv ciphers mentioned
before. For clearness, more discussion is deferred to Section
V, after we present the concrete key-schedule conditions.
Aside from clarifying KAF and KAFv models, our results
also provide new insights into designing affine key-schedules
for practical Feistel ciphers, which is a long-standing open
problem hightlighted in e.g. [23], [12]. Note that affine key-
schedules are usually preferred (e.g., DES, SIMON, etc.) due
to their efficiency and compatibility with frequently rekeying.
TWEAKABLE FEISTEL CIPHERS. By the general result of
Bellare and Kohno [18], given a ⊕-RKA secure blockcipher
Ek(M) with n-bit k, XORing the tweak t into the key, i.e.
Ek⊕t(M), gives rise to a tweakable blockcipher (TBC) with n-
bit tweaks and keys and provable security against 2n/2 queries.
Therefore, efficient tweakable Feistel ciphers with birthday
security could be obtained from our results. We stress that
tweakable Feistel ciphers obtained via our approach are in
the Random Oracle Model, i.e. with public random round-
functions, which significantly deviates from the tweakable
Luby-Rackoff ciphers [56] built upon secret random functions.
MODES FOR PERMUTATIONS. Alternatively, the variants
KAFwP,(w,γ), KAFP,γ , and KAFvP,γ
∗
can be viewed as
modes for cryptographic permutations. With the appearance
of reliable permutations such as the permutations underlying
5But in practice, this should be interpreted with caution. CLEFIA also
employs a highly non-linear key-schedule, but suffers from weak-keys [55] in
the RKA setting. Weak-keys couldn’t be covered by these theoretical analyses.
SHA-3 [51] and the Simpira family [57], our results allow
creating highly modular wide-block ciphers with some
level of provable ⊕-RKA security support, or wide-block
tweakable Feistel ciphers. These may find application in
various settings, for example, instantiating provably secure
robust authenticated encryption [60], [57], Onion-AE [58],
and disk encryption [59].
For comparison, the KAC results [29], [21], [30], [61] also
offered such permutation modes. But KAFwP,(w,γ) achieves
domain extension at the same time, i.e. it offers a provable
TBC from “smaller” permutations. This may reduce imple-
mentation cost and increase security confidence.
Finally, we remind the reader that all of our results are
derived in the Random Oracle Model. Once instantiated,
arguments and security insurance turn heuristic [63].
Related Work and Comparison. As mentioned, Barbosa
and Farshim (BF) have studied provable RKA-security of
Luby-Rackoff models [10]. Here we make a comprehensive
comparison. In detail, BF proved the following 4-round Luby-
Rackoff variant (see Eq. (1) for the function ΦGki (X))
LRk1,k2(M) = ΦGk2 (ΦGk1 (ΦGk2 (ΦGk1 (M))))
is CCA secure against RKAs, if G is an RKA-secure PRF.
BF’s work has two advantages:
(i) Their results covered a much wider range of Related-Key
Derivation (RKD) function set. Informally, this means
LRk1,k2 is secure even if the attacker queries LRψ(k1,k2)
for ψ more complicated than (k1‖k2)⊕∆.
(ii) Their round-functions are more “generic”, and could be
instantiated under complexity assumptions.
For (i), as we argued, we aim at bridging theory and reality.
The most widely-used attack model is ⊕-RKA, and it’s not
clear whether the complicated RKD functions are indeed
possible in reality. Moreover, for KAFw, RKA security against
larger RKD sets isn’t “for-free”: since the sufficient key-
schedule conditions heavily depend on the concrete RKD func-
tion (e.g. see Definition 1), more complicated key-schedules
are likely required. Random oracle KDFs should be sufficient
for all “interesting” RKD sets, but they fall short of providing
insights into practical designs. In all, it seems questionable to
spend a lot of complexity on the key-schedules to buy security
against somewhat artificial RKD sets. These clarify why we
concentrate on ⊕-RKAs. Still, considering larger RKD sets is
of theoretical interest, and is a possible future direction.
For (ii), we argue switching from Luby-Rackoff to KAFw is
a significant step in cryptography along two axes.
First, viewing Feistel networks as abstract models of real-
world blockciphers, we already argued that the Luby-Rackoff
model LRk1,k2(M), though seems generic, is arguably too
far from cryptographic reality in the RKA setting. Even in
theory there remains imperfectness: the Luby-Rackoff model
doesn’t show how to concretely design keyed primitives from
(conceptually) simpler keyless primitives; it just “defers” the
task to designing keyed round-function Gki . In the RKA
setting, this requires an RKA-secure PRF Gki from keyless
primitives, which is even harder.
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In contrast, KAFw results demonstrate how to construct
blockciphers from keyless permutations or functions, which
fitted into a hot topic (see the KAC papers [12]), and has been
recently re-emphasized by Diffie (in Leiden, March, 2018).
This nicely fills in the gap left by Luby-Rackoff results.
Second, viewing Feistel networks as modes, this represents
switching from modes for PRFs/blockciphers to modes for
keyless permutations. Permutation-based modes not only offer
more choices, but also reduce the burden of designers (they
could focus on designing one permutation without consider-
ing RKA issues). Therefore, it has been a long trend, with
prominent examples include the popular multi-purpose sponge
functions [65], permutation-based hash functions [67], [68],
and authenticated encryption modes [64], [66].
In summary, BF’s work is more foundational, and shows
how to build RKA secure PRPs from RKA secure PRFs, while
our work tries to shed more light on the practical side. BF’s
Luby-Rackoff approach also gives rise to RKA-secure ciphers
and TBCs, but it requires an RKA secure PRF, for which it
may not be easy to find an efficient and reliable candidate
(especially when a large block-size is desired).
A concurrent work of Cogliati et al. shows how to construct
wide-block TBC from SPNs [62]. They focus on (better)
beyond-birthday bounds, while we proved ⊕-RKA security
which may not be implied by tweakable pseudorandomness.
They shed lights on SPNs, while we on Feistel (that could use
non-invertible functions). In all, the two works are comple-
mentary.
Concentrating on Feistel ciphers in the ideal model, previous
works only considered KAF and KAFv. In the provable setting,
KAF has been analyzed by Lampe and Seurin [9]. While they
proved better bounds of 2
tn
t+1 queries for 6t rounds, they as-
sumed completely independent round-functions and indepen-
dent round-keys and they only considered the single-key secu-
rity. A recent improvement considered correlated round-keys,
and proved multi-user security with birthday bounds 2n/2 at
4 rounds and beyond-birthday bounds 22n/3 at 6 rounds [69].
The 4-round “minimal” KAF scheme given in [69] consumes
a (linear) orthomorphism for the key-schedule, which is very
similar to ours. Thus in some sense, our results indicate that
stronger key-schedule assumptions (i.e., non-linearity) buy ⊕-
RKA security. We additionally considered round permutation
case, and this gives rise to permutation-modes. Another (men-
tioned) work is the indifferentiability of KAFv of [38], the
security bound of which was however too weak.
Initiated in [70], a series of papers established efficient
generic approaches to obtain RKA secure blockciphers from
PRPs [10], [71], which are complementary to our “concrete”
results. Generic transformations however fall short of deepen-
ing the understanding of widely-deployed structures.
Finally, in the ideal model, key-schedule conditions that
suffice for some level of security have been characterized
for single-key security of Luby-Rackoff [72], KACs [53],
and SPNs [62], for ⊕-RKA security of KACs [21], and for
indifferentiability of Luby-Rackoff [11] and KACs, see [15]
and the reference therein. These results are complementary
to ours. Since we identified concrete conditions, our work is
closer to the series [53], [21], [62].
Possible Future Works include: investigating RKA security
of KAFw with respect to larger RKD function sets, posing
beyond-birthday secure tweakable KAFw variants, or studying
key-schedules sufficient for chosen-key security [73]. The
most attractive direction seems to prove beyond-birthday se-
curity for KAFw models with ≥ 2n-bit master-keys. This is
much closer to reality, but it requires modeling the combinato-
rial properties of “non-trivial” key-schedules for longer master-
keys, which seems quite hard. For RKA security, some level of
dependence has to be assumed between the round-keys [12].
The dependence should be both close to reality and enough for
proofs. So which type of dependence is satisfying? A natural
idea is to consider an alternating form of round-keys γ1(k),
γ2(k
′), γ3(k), γ4(k′), . . ., where k and k′ are the two halves
of a 2n-bit master-key. But this model seems too artificial.
Organization. Section II presents notations, definitions, and
tools. In Sections III and IV, we analyze the ⊕-RKA security
of KAFwf,(w,γ) with non-linear and affine (w, γ) respectively.
Then, from the KAFw results we derive results on KAF and
KAFv in Section V, and make discussion on theoretically best
possible results in Section VI. The complementing attacks are
given in Appendix B to help understanding our proofs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
General Notation. For integers 1 ≤ b ≤ a, we write
(a)b = a(a − 1) . . . (a − b + 1) and (a)0 = 1 by convention.
In all the following, we fix an integer n ≥ 1 and denote
N = 2n. Further denote by F(n) the set of all functions
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n, by P(n) the set of all permutations
on {0, 1}n, and by BC(n, 2n) the set of all blockciphers with
2n-bit block size and n-bit keys. For a finite set X , X $←− X
means that an element X is selected from X uniformly at
random. For X,Y ∈ {0, 1}n, X‖Y or simply XY denotes
their concatenation. Finally, throughout this paper, we denote
k ⊕∆ by k∆ for simplicity.
Non-linear and Affine Functions. For a function γ :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, its non-linearity could be measured by
maxa,b∈{0,1}n,a 6=0
∣∣∣{k ∈ {0, 1}n : γ(k ⊕ a)⊕ γ(k) = b}∣∣∣. (4)
Viewing the n-bit input k as an n-dimensional vector over F2,
an n-bit affine function γ can be defined as
γ(k) = M · k ⊕ C
for a fixed n × n matrix over F2 and a fixed n-dimensional
vector C over F2. By these, a t-round affine key-schedule
(w, γ) = ((w0, w1, w2, w3), (γ1, . . . , γt)) (as mentioned in the
Introduction) would be specified by t+4 fixed matrices M (w)0 ,
M
(w)
1 ,M
(w)
2 ,M
(w)
3 ,M1, . . . ,Mt, and t+4 fixed vectors/n-bit
constants C(w)0 , C
(w)
1 , C
(w)
2 , C
(w)
3 , C1, . . . , Ct:
wi(k) = M
(w)
i · k ⊕ C(w)i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, (5)
and
γj(k) = Mj · k ⊕ Cj , j = 1, . . . , t. (6)
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We stress that the multiplication M ·k should be distinguished
from the aforementioned field multiplication M⊗ k.
Uniform AXU Functions. For conciseness, we character-
ize good non-linear key-schedules using standard notions of
almost XOR-universality (AXU) and uniformity for keyed
(hash) functions. To this end, we serve their definitions below.
First, a keyed function Hk(·) from the domain X to {0, 1}n
is said to be δ-uniform, if for any x ∈ X and y ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[k
$←− K : Hk(x) = y] ≤ δ,
where K is its key space. H is said δ′-almost XOR-universal
(δ′-AXU) if for all distinct x, x′ ∈ X and all y ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[k
$←− K : Hk(x)⊕Hk(x′) = y] ≤ δ′.
KAFw Ciphers. As mentioned in the Introduction, we focus
on KAFwf,(w,γ), the KAFw variants with two features:
(i) the same function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is used at each
round, and
(ii) the key-schedule is (w, γ) = ((w0, w1, w2, w3), (γ1, . . . ,
γt)), i.e. the i-th whitening key wki is derived from the
n-bit master-key k via wki = wi(k), and the i-th round-
key ki is ki = γi(k).
For such variants, the i-th round transformation is defined as
Ψfγi(k)(WL‖WR) = WR‖WL ⊕ f(γi(k)⊕WR), (7)
where WL and WR are respectively the left and right n-bit
halves of the input. Then the t-round KAFwf,(w,γ) variant is
defined as (cf. Fig. 1)
KAFwf,(w,γ)k (W ) = wkout ⊕Ψfγt(k) ◦ . . . ◦Ψ
f
γ1(k)
(
wkin ⊕W
)
,
where wkin = w0(k)‖w1(k) and wkout = w2(k)‖w3(k). To
make it more precise, we give formal descriptions for the 4-
and 6-round KAFwf,(w,γ) that will be studied later. For the
4-round KAFwf,(w,γ)k , on the 2n-bit input W which is parsed
into L‖R, the computation proceeds in 4 steps:
(i) x1 ← γ1(k) ⊕ w1(k) ⊕ R, y1 ← f(x1), X = w0(k) ⊕
L⊕ y1;
(ii) x2 ← γ2(k)⊕X , y2 ← f(x2), Y ← w1(k)⊕R⊕ y2;
(iii) x3 ← γ3(k)⊕ Y , y3 ← f(x3), S ← X ⊕ y3 ⊕ w2(k);
(iv) x4 ← γ4(k)⊕ w2(k)⊕ S, y4 ← f(x4), T ← Y ⊕ y4 ⊕
w3(k).
One could see Fig. 1 (left) for illustration. For the 6-round
KAFwf,(w,γ)k , on input W = L‖R, the computation proceeds
in 6 steps (as in Fig. 1 (right)):
(i) x1 ← γ1(k) ⊕ w1(k) ⊕ R, y1 ← f(x1), X = w0(k) ⊕
L⊕ y1;
(ii) x2 ← γ2(k)⊕X , y2 ← f(x2), Y ← w1(k)⊕R⊕ y2;
(iii) x3 ← γ3(k)⊕ Y , y3 ← f(x3), Z ← X ⊕ y3;
(iv) x4 ← γ4(k)⊕ Z, y4 ← f(x4), A← Y ⊕ y4;
(v) x5 ← γ5(k)⊕A, y5 ← f(x5), S ← Z ⊕ y5 ⊕ w2(k);
(vi) x6 ← γ6(k)⊕ w2(k)⊕ S, y6 ← f(x6), T ← A⊕ y6 ⊕
w3(k).
As noted in [74], a KAFw cipher (even with independent
round-functions) with an even number of rounds can be seen
as a special case of a KAC. In detail, the i-th and (i + 1)-th
rounds with round-functions fi and fi+1 and round-keys ki
and ki+1 can be rewritten as
Ψ
fi+1
ki+1
◦Ψfiki(W ) = (ki+1‖ki)⊕Ψ
fi+1
0 ◦Ψfi0 ((ki+1‖ki)⊕W ),
where Ψfi+10 ◦ Ψfi0 is a keyless 2-round Feistel permutation.
However, provable results on KAFw cannot be derived by
black-box composition of existing results on KACs and keyless
Feistel, since no provable results can be seen on Ψfi+10 ◦Ψfi0
(let alone the even weaker Ψf0 ◦Ψf0 ).
As a side remark, for a 2t-round KAFw cipher, if the 2t
round-keys are identical k′ = γ1(k) = . . . = γ2t(k), then
it can be seen it’s essentially a 1-round KAC, i.e. (w2(k) ⊕
k′‖w3(k) ⊕ k′) ⊕ pi
(
(w0(k) ⊕ k′‖w1(k) ⊕ k′) ⊕W
)
, where
pi = Ψf2t0 ◦ . . . ◦Ψf10 is a keyless permutation. This is known
to be insecure against RKAs [21].
⊕-RKA Security. We follow Cogliati and Seurin [21] to
formalize ⊕-RKA security in the ideal model. In detail, let E
be a (n, 2n)-blockcipher, and fix a key k ∈ {0, 1}n. We define
the ⊕-restricted related-key oracle RK[Ek], which takes as
input an “offset” ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n and a plaintext LR ∈ {0, 1}2n,
and returns RK[Ek](∆, LR) := Ek⊕∆(LR). It allows inverse
queries, which we denote RK[Ek]−1(∆, ST ) := Ek⊕∆(ST ).
Then, we consider a ⊕-restricted related-key adversary D
which has access to a function oracle f and a related-key
oracle, and must distinguish between two worlds as follows:
• the “real” world, where it interacts with (RK[Ek], f), and
k is randomly drawn;
• the “ideal” world where it interacts with (RK[ICk], f),
where IC is an ideal cipher independent from f , and k
is randomly drawn.
The distinguisher is adaptive, and can make two-sided queries
to the related-key oracle. Note that in the ideal world, the
oracle RK[ICk] essentially implements an independent random
permutation for each offset ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n. Formally, when
f = F is a random function, D’s distinguishing advantage
on KAFwF,(w,γ) is defined as
Adv⊕-rka
KAFwF,(w,γ)k
(D)
=
∣∣∣PrIC,k,F [DRK[ICk],F = 1]− Prk,F [DRK[KAFwF,(w,γ)k ],F = 1]∣∣∣,
where the former probability is taken over the random draw
of IC $←− BC(n, 2n), k $←− {0, 1}n, F $←− F(n), and the latter
probability is taken over k $←− {0, 1}n, F $←− F(n).
For Adv⊕-rka
KAFwP,(w,γ)k
(D), P is randomly picked from the set
P(n), i.e. P $←− P(n). Here the superscripts help distinguish
between random function- and permutation-based KAFw.
Furthermore, we consider computationally unbounded dis-
tinguishers, and we assume without loss of generality (wlog)
that the distinguisher is deterministic and never makes re-
dundant queries. For non-negative integers qe, qf , we define
the insecurity of the KAFwf,(w,γ) cipher against ⊕-restricted
related-key attacks as
Adv⊕-rka
KAFwf,(w,γ)k
(qf , qe) = maxDAdv⊕-rkaKAFwf,(w,γ)k
(D),
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where the maximum is taken over all distinguishers D making
exactly qf queries to the function oracle and in total qe queries
to the related-key oracle (termed as (qf , qe)-distinguishers).
The H-Coefficients Technique. We employ the H-coefficient
technique [75], and follow the paradigm of Chen and Stein-
berger [13]. To this end, we summarize the information
gathered by the distinguisher in tuples QE and Qf . The tuple
QE = ((∆1, L1R1, S1T1), . . . , (∆qe , LqeRqe , SqeTqe))
summarizes the queries to the related-key oracle, and means
that the j-th query was either a forward query (∆j , LjRj) with
answer SjTj , or a backward query (∆j , SjTj) with answer
LjRj . Throughout the remaining, we’ll use the bold letter t
as a simplified notation for a tuple (∆, LR, ST ) in QE .
Similarly to QE , the tuple
Qf = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xqf , yqf ))
summarizes the queries to the round-function f , and
• when f = P is an invertible permutation, it means the
j-th query was either a forward query xj with answer yj
or a backward query yj with answer xj ;
• when f = F is a non-invertible function, it means F
was queried on x1, . . . , xqf and answered y1, . . . , yqf
correspondingly.
To simplify the arguments (in particular, the definition of
“bad transcripts”), we reveal to the distinguisher the key k
at the end of the interaction. This is wlog since D is free to
ignore this additional information to compute its output bit.
Formally, we append k to (QE ,Qf ) and obtain what we call
the transcript τ = (QE ,Qf , k) of the attack. With respect to
some fixed distinguisher D, a transcript τ is said attainable
if there exists oracles (IC, f) such that the interaction of D
with the ideal world (RK[ICk], f) yields τ . We denote T the
set of attainable transcripts. In all the following, we denote
Tre, resp. Tid, the probability distribution of the transcript τ
induced by the real world, resp. the ideal world (note that these
two probability distributions depend on the distinguisher). By
extension, we use the same notation for a random variable
distributed according to each distribution. And we define
Prre(τ) = Pr[Tre = τ ] and Prid(τ) = Pr[Tid = τ ].
Given a tuple Qf of function queries and a function f , we
say that f extends Qf , denoted f ` Qf , if f(x) = y for all
(x, y) ∈ Qf . Similarly, given a related-key oracle transcript
QE , a blockcipher E, and a key k ∈ {0, 1}n, we say the
related-key oracle RK[Ek] extends QE , denoted RK[Ek] `
QE , if Ek⊕∆(LR) = ST for all (∆, LR, ST ) ∈ QE . It is
easy to see that for any attainable transcript τ = (QE ,Qf , k),
the interaction of the distinguisher with oracles (RK[Ek], f)
produces τ if and only if RK[Ek] ` QE and f ` Qf .
With all the above definitions, the main lemma of H-
coefficients technique is as follows.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 in [53]) Fix a distinguisher D. Let
T = Tgood ∪ Tbad be a partition of the set of attainable
transcripts T . Assume that there exists ε1 such that for any
τ ∈ Tgood, one has
Prre(τ)
Prid(τ)
≥ 1− ε1,
and that there exists ε2 such that Pr[Tid ∈ Tbad] ≤ ε2. Then
Adv(D) ≤ ε1 + ε2.
A proof could be found in [53].
Finally, it’s not hard to see
Prid(τ) = Pr[f ` Qf ] · Pr[RK[ICk] ` QE ]
≤ Pr[f ` Qf ] ·
(
1
N2 − qe
)qe
.
III. KAFW WITH NON-LINEAR KEY-SCHEDULES
It is well-known that 3-round Feistel networks are not
CCA secure even in the single-key setting. So we consider 4-
round KAFw. First, in section III-A, we present key-schedule
conditions that are sufficient for the ⊕-RKA security of the 4-
round KAFwP,(w,γ) (which also turn out sufficient for 4-round
KAFwF,(w,γ)). Then, we start from KAFwP,(w,γ), analyze it in
section III-B, and then discuss how to adapt the proof for the
4-round KAFwF,(w,γ) variant (by “dropping” some modules
from the proof for KAFwP,(w,γ)) in section III-C.
A. Conditions on the Key-Schedules
4-round key-schedules defined as follows would suffice.
Definition 1 (Good Key-Schedule for 4 Rounds) Consider
a 4-round key-schedule (w, γ), where w = (w0, w1, w2,
w3) for wi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4)
for γi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Then (w, γ) is good, if
ϕ1(k) = w1(k)⊕ γ1(k) and ϕ4(k) = w2(k)⊕ γ4(k) satisfy
two conditions as follows:
(i) for i = 1, 4, the function Hk(∆) := ϕi(k ⊕ ∆) is δ1-
uniform and δ2-AXU;
(ii) the function Hk(∆,∆′) := ϕ1(k ⊕∆)⊕ ϕ4(k ⊕∆′) is
δ3-uniform.
An example of good key-schedules with δ1, δ2, δ3 ≤ 3/N was
exhibited in the Introduction, cf. Our Contributions.
Note that ϕ1(k) and ϕ4(k) effectively mask (and protect)
the inputs to the 1st and last round-functions respectively.
This protection would be ineffective if the δ1-uniformness is
seriously compromised. An extreme example is ϕ1(k) = 0,
for which an adversary could freely compute the 2nd-round
intermediate value as R‖L⊕ F (R).
Further note that, ϕi(k ⊕∆) is δ2-AXU essentially means
the non-linearity (see Eq. (4)) of ϕi is δ2N . This condition
is intended to reduce the probability of 1-round related-key
differentials with non-zero master-key differences; see the
argument for condition (B-2) in page 8.
Finally, the 2nd condition is intended to prevent the derived
round-keys from harmful “palindrome-like” properties [72] in
the RKA setting. For example, consider a key-schedule (w, γ)
such that w(k) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and it’s easy to derive ∆ for
which γ(k) = (k′′, 0, 0, k′) and γ(k ⊕ ∆) = (k′, 0, 0, k′′′)
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for any master-key k, i.e., ϕ1(k ⊕ ∆) ⊕ ϕ4(k) = γ1(k ⊕
∆) ⊕ γ4(k) = 0. Then it can be distinguished by querying
RK[Ek](0, LR) → ST , RK[Ek](∆, TS) → R′L′, and check-
ing if R = R′.
Actually, it might be possible to prove security without
the 2nd condition. But this requires γ2 and γ3 to fulfill
more involved conditions. Therefore, our Definition 1, with
no requirement on γ2 and γ3 at the expense of slightly more
requirements on ϕ1 and ϕ4, captures a “minimal” group of
conditions to some extent.
B. Security for 4 Rounds with Good Key-Schedules and f=P
Instantiated with a good key-schedule, the 4-round
KAFwP,(w,γ) is secure against ⊕-RKAs.
Theorem 1 When qf + 2qe ≤ N/2, for the 4-round, random
permutation-based KAFwP,(w,γ) cipher with a good key-
schedule (w, γ) as specified in Definition 1, it holds
Adv⊕-rka
KAFwP,(w,γ)
k
(qf , qe) ≤ 2δ1qeqf+(δ2+δ3)q2e+
8qeqf + 27q
2
e + 4qe
N
.
Proof . We first introduce some notations that will ease the
subsequent analysis. Let τ = (QE ,QP , k) be an attainable
transcript, with |QE | = qe and |QP | = qf . For convenience,
for the involved QP = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xqf , yqf )), we define
two sets
X (τ) def=== {x1, . . . , xqf }, and Y(τ) def=== {y1, . . . , yqf }.
For any tuple t = (∆, LR, ST ) in QE and any function f
(f = P or F ; the former is the focus of this subsection), we
define 10 functions
x1(t) = ϕ1(k ⊕∆)⊕R,
y1(t, f) = f(x1(t)),
X(t, f) = L⊕ w0(k ⊕∆)⊕ y1(t, f),
x2(t, f) = γ2(k ⊕∆)⊕X(t, f),
y2(t, f) = R⊕ w1(k ⊕∆)⊕ Y (t, f),
Y (t, f) = T ⊕ w3(k ⊕∆)⊕ y4(t, f),
x3(t, f) = γ3(k ⊕∆)⊕ Y (t, f),
y3(t, f) = S ⊕ w2(k ⊕∆)⊕X(t, f),
x4(t) = ϕ4(k ⊕∆)⊕ S,
y4(t, f) = f(x4(t)).
The suffix f emphasizes that the functions depend on f . Note
that these values are derived in an “LR → X,Y ← ST ”
manner, rather than the “LR → X → Y → ST ” manner.
Moreover, x1(t) and x4(t) only depend on τ .
To ease understanding our proofs, below we serve an
overview of our strategy.
1) Proof Strategy: Following Lemma 1, with respect to
a fixed (qf , qe)-distinguisher D, below in section III-B2 we
define bad transcripts, and upper bound their probability of
occurring in the ideal world. This probability is computed over
the random choice of the key, and thus we could leverage the
properties of good key-schedules.
Later in section III-B3, we lower bound Prre(τ) (and thus
the ratio Prre(τ)/Prid(τ)) for any good τ . In this step we
follow [62] and define a “bad” predicate B(P ) on P , such
that collisions in the 2qe inputs in the 2nd and 3rd rounds
x2(t1, P ), . . . , x2(tqe , P ), x3(t1, P ), . . . , x3(tqe , P ) (8)
and collisions in the 2qe corresponding outputs
y2(t1, P ), . . . , y2(tqe , P ), y3(t1, P ), . . . , y3(tqe , P ) (9)
are classified as conditions of B(P ). These values are deter-
mined by P and thus random. Consequently, Pr[B(P )] could
be upper bounded. In addition, as long as B(P ) is not fulfilled,
it is easy to transform the probability Prre(τ) into the (easy-
to-bound) probability that
Pr[∀i ∈ {1, . . . , qe}, j = 2, 3 : P (xj(ti, P )) = yj(ti, P )],
i.e., P is consistent with the inputs/outputs of the middle two
rounds. These cinch the final bound.
2) Bad Transcripts: defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Bad Transcripts for 4-Round KAFwP,(w,γ))
An attainable transcript τ = (QE ,QP , k) is bad, if at least
one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
• (B-1) ∃t ∈ QE : x1(t) ∈ X (τ) or x4(t) ∈ X (τ);
• (B-2) ∃t = (∆, LR, ST ) and t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) in
QE such that ∆ 6= ∆′, and x1(t) = x1(t′) or x4(t) =
x4(t
′);
• (B-3) ∃t = (∆, LR, ST ) and t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) in
QE such that x1(t) = x4(t′) (it could be t = t′);
• (B-4) there exist two distinct queries (∆, LR, ST ) and
(∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) in QE such that ∆ = ∆′, and
– L⊕ L′ = S ⊕ S′, or R⊕R′ = T ⊕ T ′.
• (B-5) there exists (∆, LR, ST ) ∈ QE such that
– L⊕w0(k⊕∆) = S⊕w2(k⊕∆), or R⊕w1(k⊕∆) =
T ⊕ w3(k ⊕∆).
Otherwise we say τ is good. Denote by Tbad the set of bad
transcripts.
We analyze the conditions in turn, with (B-1) the first. For any
t = (∆, LR, ST ) in QE and any x, as Hk(∆) = ϕ1(k ⊕∆)
is δ1-uniform (cf. Definition 1), we immediately have
Pr[x1(t) ∈ X (τ)] = Pr[∃x ∈ X (τ) : ϕ1(k∆) = R⊕ x] ≤ δ1qf .
Similarly, Pr[x4(t) ∈ X (τ)] ≤ δ1qf . Since there are qe
choices for t, we have
Pr[(B-1)] ≤ 2δ1qeqf .
For (B-2), since Hk(∆) = ϕi(k ⊕ ∆) is δ2-AXU for i =
1, 4, for each pair (t, t′) with t = (∆, LR, ST ) and t′ =
(∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) we have
Pr[x1(t) = x1(t
′) or x4(t) = x4(t′)]
= Pr[ϕ1(k ⊕∆)⊕R = ϕ1(k ⊕∆′)⊕R′
or ϕ4(k ⊕∆)⊕ S = ϕ4(k ⊕∆′)⊕ S′] ≤ 2δ2.
As we have at most
(
qe
2
) ≤ q2e2 choices for (t, t′) it holds
Pr[(B-2)] ≤ δ2q2e .
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For (B-3), since Hk(∆,∆′) = ϕ1(k ⊕∆)⊕ ϕ4(k ⊕∆′) is
δ3-uniform, for each pair (t, t′) we have
Pr[x1(t) = x4(t
′)]
= Pr[ϕ1(k ⊕∆)⊕ ϕ4(k ⊕∆′) = R⊕ S′] ≤ δ3.
Summing over the q2e choices of (t, t
′) yields Pr[(B-3)] ≤
δ3q
2
e .
For (B-4), consider a pair (t, t′). Wlog assume that t′ comes
after t. If t′ was forward RK[ICk](∆, L′R′)→ S′T ′, then the
obtained S′T ′ is uniform in a set of size at least N2− qe, and
since qe ≤ N we have
PrIC[S
′ = L⊕ L′ ⊕ S] ≤ N
N2 − qe ≤
1
N − 1 ≤
2
N
.
Similarly, PrIC[T ′ = R ⊕ R′ ⊕ T ] ≤ 2N . If t′ was backward
RK[ICk]−1(∆, S′T ′)→ L′R′, then similarly
PrIC[L
′ = L⊕ S ⊕ S′] ≤ 2
N
, PrIC[R
′ = R⊕ T ⊕ T ′] ≤ 2
N
.
Therefore, for each of the
(
qe
2
) ≤ q2e2 pairs (t, t′), (B-4) is
fulfilled with probability at most 4/N . Thus Pr[(B-4)] ≤ 2q2eN .
Finally consider (B-5). Fix a query t = (∆, LR, ST ). For
k ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by R1 the set of possible values of
w0(k∆)⊕w2(k∆), and by R2 the set of values of w1(k∆)⊕
w3(k∆). If t was forward, then the obtained ST is uniform
in ≥ N2 − qe values, and (as argued) PrIC[L ⊕ S = v] ≤ 2N
for any fixed value v ∈ R1 and PrIC[R ⊕ T = v′] ≤ 2N for
any v′ ∈ R2. Therefore,
PrIC[L⊕ w0(k∆) = S ⊕ w2(k∆)]
=
∑
v∈R1
PrIC[L⊕ S = v] · Prk[w0(k∆)⊕ w2(k∆) = v]
≤ 2
N
·
∑
v∈R1
Prk[w0(k∆)⊕ w2(k∆) = v]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≤ 2
N
.
Similarly, PrIC[R ⊕ w1(k∆) = T ⊕ w3(k∆)] ≤ 2N . When
t was backward, LR is uniform, and similar bounds hold.
Taking a union bound for the qe queries gives Pr[(B-5)] ≤ 4qeN .
Summing over the above yields
Pr[Tid ∈ Tbad] ≤ 2δ1qeqf + (δ2 + δ3)q2e +
2q2e + 4qe
N
. (10)
3) Ratio Prre(τ)/Prid(τ) for Good τ : Fix a good tran-
script τ . As per our remark before, we define the bad predicate
B(P ) in paragraph III-B3a. Then, it’s easy to see
Prre(τ) = PrP
[
RK[KAFwP,(w,γ)k ] ` QE ∧ P ` QP
]
≥ PrP
[
RK[KAFwP,(w,γ)k ] ` QE ∧ P ` QP ∧ ¬B(P )
]
≥ p ·
(
1− PrP [B(P ) | P ` QP ]
)
· PrP [P ` QP ], (11)
where
p = PrP
[
RK[KAFwP,(w,γ)k ] ` QE | P ` QP ∧ ¬B(P )
]
.
We next argue
p ≥ 1
N2qe
(12)
in paragraphs III-B3b and III-B3c. Gathering this and Eq. (11)
yields
Prre(τ) ≥ PrP [P ` QP ]
N2qe
(
1− PrP [B(P ) | P ` QP ]
)
, (13)
which allows us to conclude in paragraph III-B3d.
a) The Bad Predicate B(P ): For any P ` QP , the
predicate B(P ) holds, if any of the following is fulfilled:
• (C-1) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE : x1(t) 6= x1(t′), yet either x2(t, P ) =
x2(t
′, P ) or y3(t, P ) = y3(t′, P ).
• (C-2) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE (could be t = t′):
– x2(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or y3(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ), or
– x2(t, P ) = x1(t′) or x2(t, P ) = x4(t′), or
– y3(t, P ) = y1(t′, P ) or y3(t, P ) = y4(t′, P ).
• (C-3) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE : x4(t) 6= x4(t′), yet either x3(t, P ) =
x3(t
′, P ) or y2(t, P ) = y2(t′, P ).
• (C-4) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE (could be t = t′):
– x3(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or y2(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ), or
– x3(t, P ) ∈
{
x1(t
′), x2(t′, P ), x4(t′)
}
, or
– y2(t, P ) ∈
{
y1(t
′, P ), y3(t′, P ), y4(t′, P )
}
.
Remark. As per our discussion before, collisions in the 2qe
values in Eq. (8) and in the 2qe values in Eq. (9) are
captured by (C-1) and (C-3) resp. Moreover, there should be
no “conflict” between these 4qe values and the inputs/outputs
in 1st and 4th rounds, as captured by (C-2) and (C-4). This is
crucial, as the values of the forms P (x1(t)) and P (x4(t))
will be used for bounding Pr[B(P )], and it’s unclear how
this affects their distribution. Finally, note that x2(t, P ) and
y3(t, P ) depends on the same random value P (x1(t)) (and
could be analyzed at the same time), while x3(t, P ) and
y2(t, P ) depends on P (x4(t)): this clarifies the order of the
above bad conditions.
We now analyze Pr[B(P )]. Let t = (∆, LR, ST ). Consider
(C-1) first. For each pair (t, t′), the event x2(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )
implies
γ2(k∆)⊕ L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ P (x1(t))
=γ2(k∆′)⊕ L⊕ w0(k∆′)⊕ P (x1(t′)). (14)
Define a set of function values S = {P (xi(t′)) | t′ ∈
QE , i = 1, 4, xi(t′) 6= x1(t)
}
. Then |S| ≤ 2qe, and
P (x1(t
′)) ∈ S since x1(t) 6= x1(t′). Furthermore, by ¬(B-
1) we have x1(t) /∈ X (τ). Thus conditioned on P ` QP
and further the function values in S, P (x1(t)) is uniform
in a set of size at least N − qf − 2qe. This means the left
hand side of Eq. (14) is random conditioned on the right hand
side, thus Pr[x2(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe . Similarly,
Pr[y3(t, P ) = y3(t
′, P )] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe . As we have
(
qe
2
) ≤ q2e2
pairs (t, t′), it holds Pr[(C-1)] ≤ q2eN−qf−2qe . A symmetrical
analysis yields Pr[(C-3)] ≤ (qe2 ) · 2N−qf−2qe ≤ q2eN−qf−2qe .
We next consider (C-2). As argued, for any t, X(t, P ) is
uniform in ≥ N − qf − 2qe possibilities. On the other hand,
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all the values in X (τ) are fixed by τ and thus independent
from the function values of P . Therefore,
Pr[x2(t, P ) ∈ X (τ)] = Pr[γ2(k ⊕∆)⊕X(t, P ) ∈ X (τ)]
≤ qf
N − qf − 2qe . (15)
Similarly,
Pr[∃t′ : x2(t, P ) = x1(t′) or x2(t, P ) = x4(t′)]
≤ 2qe
N − qf − 2qe , (16)
Pr[y3(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ)] ≤ qf
N − qf − 2qe . (17)
Now consider Pr[∃t′ : y3(t, P ) = y4(t′, P )]. If this event
happens, then
L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ P (x1(t))⊕ w2(k∆)⊕ S = P (x4(t′)).
By ¬(B-3) we have x1(t) 6= x4(t′), so P (x4(t′)) is random
conditioned on the left hand side. Therefore,
Pr[∃t′ : y3(t, P ) = y4(t′, P )] ≤ qe
N − qf − 2qe . (18)
Finally consider Pr[∃t′ : y3(t, P ) = y1(t′, P )]. If this event
happens, then for t there exists t′ ∈ QE such that
L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ P (x1(t))⊕ w2(k∆)⊕ S = P (x1(t′)). (19)
We distinguish two cases:
(i) Case 1: x1(t) 6= x1(t′). Then P (x1(t′)) is random con-
ditioned on P (x1(t)), and Pr[Eq. (19)] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe ;
(ii) Case 2: x1(t) = x1(t′). Then for this tuple t we have
L ⊕ w0(k∆) = w2(k∆) ⊕ S, which contradicts ¬(B-5)
(Definition 2).
As we have qe choices for t′ we obtain
Pr[∃t′ : y3(t, P ) = y1(t′, P )] ≤ qe
N − qf − 2qe . (20)
Summing over (15), (16), (17), (18), and (20), and taking union
bound on the qe choices of t, we obtain
Pr[(C-2)] ≤ qe(qf + 2qe + qf + qe + qe)
N − qf − 2qe ≤
2qe(qf + 2qe)
N − qf − 2qe . (21)
The analysis for (C-4) is similar by symmetry: for each
t = (∆, LR, ST ) ∈ QE , P (x4(t)) and further Y (t, P ) =
T ⊕w3(k∆)⊕ P (x4(t)), x3(t, P ), and y2(t, P ) are uniform.
By this, for t,
Pr[x3(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or y2(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ)] ≤ 2qf
N − qf − 2qe , (22)
Pr[∃t′ : x3(t, P ) = x1(t′) or x3(t, P ) = x4(t′)]
≤ 2qe
N − qf − 2qe , (23)
Now consider Pr[∃t′ : x3(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )]. If it happens,
then for t there exists t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) such that
γ3(k∆)⊕ T ⊕ w3(k∆)⊕ P (x4(t))
=γ2(k∆′)⊕ L′ ⊕ w0(k∆′)⊕ P (x1(t′)). (24)
By ¬(B-3) we have x4(t) 6= x1(t′), so the right hand side
of (24) is random conditioned on P (x4(t)). Thus we have
Pr[Eq. (24)] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe , and further
Pr[∃t′ : x3(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )] ≤ qe
N − qf − 2qe . (25)
By similar arguments, it can be shown
Pr[∃t′ : y2(t, P ) = y1(t′) or y2(t, P ) = y3(t′, P )]
≤ 2qe
N − qf − 2qe . (26)
Finally consider Pr[∃t′ : y2(t, P ) = y4(t′, P )]. For t if it
happens then there exists t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) such that
R⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ T ⊕ w3(k∆)⊕ P (x4(t)) = P (x4(t′)). (27)
If x4(t) 6= x4(t′) then the right hand side of (27) is random
conditioned on P (x4(t)) and thus Pr[Eq. (27)] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe ;
otherwise i.e. x4(t) = x4(t′), then it implies R ⊕ w1(k∆) =
T ⊕ w3(k∆), contradicting ¬(B-5). So
Pr[∃t′ : y2(t, P ) = y4(t′, P )] ≤ qe
N − qf − 2qe . (28)
Summing over (22), (23), (25), (26), and (28), and taking union
over qe yield
Pr[(C-4)] ≤ qe(2qf + 2qe + qe + 2qe + qe)
N − qf − 2qe ≤
2qe(qf + 3qe)
N − qf − 2qe .
Finally, summing over the four conditions yields
Pr[P
$←− P(n) : B(P ) | P ` QP ] ≤ 4qeqf + 12q
2
e
N − qf − 2qe . (29)
b) The Probability p: For any P ∗ ` QP such that B(P ∗)
doesn’t hold, we define an “extended transcript”
Qout(P ∗) = {(x1(t), y1(t, P ∗)), (x4(t), y4(t, P ∗))}t∈QE .
We further define T out as the set of all such extended
transcripts, i.e.,
T out = {Qout(P )}
P∈P(n),
and a set of “good” extended transcripts based on permutations
that don’t fulfill the bad predicate, i.e.,
T outgood =
{Qout(P ∗)}
P∗`QP ,¬B(P∗).
Next, for any instance Qout ∈ T out, we define another
extended transcript Qmid(Qout). Formally, let P ∗ be a per-
mutation such that Qout(P ∗) = Qout, then
Qmid(Qout) = {(x2(t), y2(t, P ∗)), (x3(t), y3(t, P ∗))}t∈QE .
It’s easy to see that such a choice of P ∗ may not be
unique, but for all P ∗ with Qout(P ∗) = Qout, the transcripts
Qmid(Qout) defined as above are the same since the condition
Qout(P ∗) = Qout ensures that P ∗ is consistent with the input-
output relations defined in Qout which will fully characterize
Qmid(Qout).
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With these, by the definitions of KAFw we have
p =
∑
Qout∈T out
Pr[P ` Qout | P ` QP ∧ ¬B(P )]
· Pr[P ` Qmid(Qout) | P ` (Qout ∪QP ) ∧ ¬B(P )]
≥
∑
Qout∈T out
good
Pr[P ` Qout | P ` QP ∧ ¬B(P )]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
· Pr[P ` Qmid(Qout) | P ` (Qout ∪QP ) ∧ ¬B(P )]
For any Qout ∈ T outgood, the conditions ¬(C-2) and ¬(C-4)
ensure that
{x ∣∣ ∃y : (x, y) ∈ Qmid(Qout)}⋂
{x′ ∣∣ ∃y′ : (x′, y′) ∈ (Qout ∪QP )} = ∅,
{y ∣∣ ∃x : (x, y) ∈ Qmid(Qout)}⋂
{y′ ∣∣ ∃x′ : (x′, y′) ∈ (Qout ∪QP )} = ∅.
Thus
Pr[P ` Qmid(Qout) | P ` (Qout∪QP )∧¬B(P )] ≥ 1
N |Qmid(Qout)|
.
In the next paragraph, we show |Qmid(Qout)| = 2qe to
complete the proof of Eq. (12) and further (13).
c) 2qe Relations for Good P : By the definitions, for any
Qout ∈ T outgood, there exists P ` QP such that B(P ) doesn’t
hold, and Qout(P ) = Qout. Now we can write
Qmid(Qout) = {(x2(t, P ), y2(t, P )), (x3(t, P ), y3(t, P ))}.
We show
∣∣{x2(t, P ), x3(t, P ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣ = 2qe and∣∣{y2(t, P ), y3(t, P ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣ = 2qe. First, by ¬B(P ) (i.e.,
¬(C-4)), for any pair (t, t′), it holds x2(t, P ) 6= x3(t′, P ) and
y2(t, P ) 6= y3(t′, P ). It remains to show
• x2(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ), y2(t, P ) 6= y2(t′, P ), and
• x3(t, P ) 6= x3(t′, P ), y3(t, P ) 6= y3(t′, P ).
Consider (x2(t, P ), x2(t′, P )) and (y3(t, P ), y3(t′, P )) first:
their proof flows are similar. In detail, let t = (∆, LR, ST )
and t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′), then we exclude possibility of
x2(t, P ) = x2(t
′, P ) or y3(t, P ) = y3(t′, P ) for each case:
(i) Case 1: ∆ 6= ∆′. Then x1(t, P ) 6= x1(t′, P ) by ¬(B-2)
(see Definition 2), and further x2(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ) and
y3(t, P ) 6= y3(t′, P ) by ¬(C-1);
(ii) Case 2: ∆ = ∆′, yet R 6= R′. Then still x1(t, P ) 6=
x1(t
′, P ), thus further x2(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ) and
y3(t, P ) 6= y3(t′, P );
(iii) Case 3: ∆ = ∆′ and R = R′. Then it has to be L 6= L′
since t′ 6= t′. Now:
• On one hand, L 6= L′ immediately implies
x2(t, P ) = L ⊕ w0(k∆) ⊕ y1(t, P ) ⊕ γ2(k∆) and
x2(t
′, P ) = L′ ⊕ w0(k∆) ⊕ y1(t, P ) ⊕ γ2(k∆) are
distinct;
• On the other hand, ∆ = ∆′ and R = R′ imply
X(t, P )⊕X(t′, P ) = L⊕ L′. By this, y3(t, P ) =
X(t, P ) ⊕ w2(k∆) ⊕ S = y3(t′, P ) = X(t′, P ) ⊕
w2(k∆) ⊕ S′ would imply L ⊕ L′ = S ⊕ S′,
contradicting ¬(B-4).
By the above, it does hold x2(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ) and
y3(t, P ) 6= y3(t′, P ) for any t′ 6= t′. A symmetrical argument
could establish x3(t, P ) 6= x3(t′, P ) and y2(t, P ) 6= y2(t′, P )
for any t′ 6= t′.
d) The Final Counting: By the above discussion and
(13) and (29), when qf + 2qe ≤ N/2, for any τ ∈ Tgood
we have
Prre(τ)
Prid(τ)
≥PrP [P ` QP ]
N2qe
(
1− PrP [B(P )]
)/
PrP [P ` QP ]
(N2 − qe)qe
≥
(
1− 4qeqf + 12q
2
e
N − qf − 2qe
)(
N2 − qe
N2
)qe
≥
(
1− 8qeqf + 24q
2
e
N
)(
1− q
2
e
N2
)
≥1− 8qeqf + 25q
2
e
N
.
Gathering this, (10), and Lemma 1 yields Theorem 1.
C. When f=F is a Random Function
With a good key-schedule specified in Definition 1, the ⊕-
RKA security claim still holds when we use a random function
F for f . For the proof, we make some moderate modifications
to the previous proof for KAFwP,(w,γ). First, (of course) the
helper functions y1(t, P ), X(t, P ), . . . here are defined on F
instead of P , i.e. y1(t, F ), X(t, F ), . . .
Then, note that since F is a random function, for the to-be-
derived 2qe equalities{
F (x2(t, F )) = y2(t, F ), F (x3(t, F )) = y3(t, F )
∣∣ t ∈ QE},
collisions within the image set {y2(t, F ), y3(t, F )
∣∣ t ∈ QE}
would not be troublesome. Therefore, the main task is to drop
definitions and arguments concerning these image values.
In detail, we recall that in the definition of bad transcripts
(Definition 2),
• the condition (B-4) is only used for proving∣∣{y2(t, F ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣ = ∣∣{y3(t, F ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣ = qe in
the subsequent analysis, cf. the Case 3 in page 11, and
• (B-5) is only used for bounding Pr[∃t, t′ : y2(t, F ) =
y4(t
′, F )] and Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, F ) = y1(t′, F )], cf. Eq.
(19) and (27) in page 10.
So both (B-4) and (B-5) could be dropped. On the other
hand, (B-1), (B-2), and (B-3) and their probabilities remain
unchanged. Subtracting the corresponding terms from (10)
yields the following bound for 4-round KAFwF,(w,γ)
Pr[Tid ∈ Tbad] ≤ 2δ1qeqf + (δ2 + δ3)q2e . (30)
We then modify the definition of B(P ) into B(F ). We
remark that for any value x such that F (x) remains unknown,
the function value F (x) is uniform in {0, 1}n, which slightly
deviates from the permutation case. Then, following the idea
as before, we make the following modifications:
(i) Dropping y3(t, F ) = y3(t′, F ) in (C-1). This decreases
Pr[(C-1)] to q
2
e
2N (with the above remark in mind);
(ii) Dropping the condition(s) ∃t, t′ : y3(t, F ) ∈ Y(τ) ∨
y3(t, F ) = y1(t
′, F ) ∨ y3(t, F ) = y4(t′, F ) in (C-2).
This decreases Pr[(C-2)] to qe(qf+2qe)N ;
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(iii) Dropping y2(t, F ) = y2(t′, F ) in (C-3). This decreases
Pr[(C-3)] to q
2
e
2N ;
(iv) Dropping the condition(s) ∃t, t′ : y2(t, F ) ∈ Y(τ) ∨
y2(t, F ) = y1(t
′, F ) ∨ y2(t, F ) = y3(t′, F ) ∨
y2(t, F ) = y4(t
′, F ) in (C-4). This decreases Pr[(C-2)]
to qe(qf+3qe)N .
In total we have
Pr[F
$←− F(n) : B(F ) | F ` QF ] ≤ 2qeqf + 6q
2
e
N
.
Finally,
Pr[F
$←− F(n) : RK[KAFwF,(w,γ)k ] ` QE | F ` QF ∧ ¬B(F )]
≥ PrF
[∀t ∈ QE : F (x2(t, F )) = y2(t, F )
∧ F (x3(t, F )) = y3(t, F )
]
=
1
N2qe
.
Therefore,
Prre(τ)
Prid(τ)
≥ 1− 2qeqf + 6q
2
e
N
− q
2
e
N2
. (31)
Gathering (30) and (31) yields
Theorem 2 For the 4-round, random function-based
KAFwF,(w,γ) cipher with a good key-schedule (w, γ) as
specified in Definition 1, it holds
Adv⊕-rka
KAFwF,(w,γ)
k
(qf , qe) ≤ 2δ1qeqf + (δ2 + δ3)q2e + 2qeqf + 7q
2
e
N
.
IV. KAFW WITH AFFINE KEY-SCHEDULES
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of
KAFw with affine key-schedules. First, in section IV-A, we
describe attacks against 4- and 5-round KAFw. These attacks
can be easily adapted to KAF (of more general interest for at-
tacks). Then, we prove security for 6-round KAFwP,(w,γ) and
KAFwF,(w,γ) in sections IV-B and IV-C respectively.
A. Insecurity for 4 and 5 Rounds
We stress that, for attacks we consider KAFw built upon
any round-functions, and thus notations used in this subsection
have slightly different meanings than those from section II.
In detail, let (w, γ) be a t-round key-schedule, and
−→
f =
(f1, . . . , ft) be any t functions. Then we define a t-round
KAFw variant
KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ)
k (W ) = wkout ⊕Ψftγt(k) ◦ . . . ◦Ψ
f1
γ1(k)
(
wkin ⊕W
)
,
where wkin = w0(k)‖w1(k) and wkout = w2(k)‖w3(k). And
for any distinguisher D, we define
Adv⊕-rka
KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ)
k
(D)
=
∣∣∣PrIC,k[DRK[ICk],−→f = 1]− Prk[DRK[KAFw−→f ,(w,γ)k ],−→f = 1]∣∣∣.
With these notations, subsubsections IV-A1 and IV-A2 below
present negative results on 4 and 5 rounds respectively.
1) Insecurity for 4 Rounds with Any Affine Key-
Schedules: From a cryptanalytic point of view, note that for
KAFw with affine key-schedules, we have 2-round related-
key differential characteristics with probability 1: see Eq. (32)
and (33) below. Concatenating them would yield a 4-round
related-key boomerang distinguisher [25] that consumes only
four related-key oracle queries. Formally, we have
Theorem 3 There exists a (0, 4)-distinguisher D such that,
for any 4 functions
−→
f = (f1, f2, f3, f4) and any 4-round affine
key-schedule (w, γ) where w and γ are as defined in Eq. (5)
and (6), it holds
Adv⊕-rka
KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ)
k
(D) ≥ 1− 1
N2 − 1 .
Proof: We denote generically (RK[Ek],
−→
f ) the ora-
cles to which the adversary has access, where E is either
KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ) or IC. The distinguisher D proceeds as:
(1) choose arbitrary values L,R,∆ ∈ {0, 1}n, ∆ 6= 0, let
∇1 = (M (w)0 ⊕M2) ·∆, ∇2 = (M (w)1 ⊕M1) ·∆, ∇3 =
(M4⊕M (w)2 )·∆, and ∇4 = (M3⊕M (w)3 )·∆. Make two
queries RK[Ek](0, L‖R) → S‖T and RK[Ek](∆, L ⊕
∇1‖R⊕∇2)→ S′‖T ′;
(2) make two decryption queries RK[Ek]−1(∆, S′′‖T ′′) →
L′′‖R′′ and RK[Ek]−1(0, S′′′‖T ′′′) → L′′′‖R′′′, for
S′′‖T ′′ = S⊕∇3‖T⊕∇4 and S′′′‖T ′′′ = S′⊕∇3‖T ′⊕
∇4;
(3) if (L′′‖R′′) ⊕ (L′′′‖R′′′) = ∇1‖∇2 then output 1 to
indicate E is KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ), and otherwise 0: E is IC.
We show the output is always 1 when E is KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ). It’s
not hard to see for any i and any V,∆ ∈ {0, 1}n, it holds
γi(k)⊕ V = γi(k∆)⊕ V ⊕Mi ·∆
for k∆ = k ⊕∆. By this, for any ∆, it holds
Pr
k,V,W
[
Ψfiγi(k)(V ‖W )⊕Ψ
fi
γi(k)
(V ⊕Mi+1 ·∆‖W ⊕Mi ·∆)
= Mi ·∆‖Mi+1 ·∆
]
= 1.
This is essentially a 1-round related-key differential with
probability 1. To ease exposition, we follow the notation
in [23] and denote this phenomena by
Pr
(
Mi+1 ·∆‖Mi ·∆
Ψ
fi
γi(k)−−−−→
∆
Mi ·∆‖Mi+1 ·∆
)
= 1.
Concatenating two such differentials gives rise to two 2-round
related-key differentials with probability 1 as follows
Pr
(
∇1‖∇2
Ψ
f2
γ2(k)
◦Ψf1
γ1(k)
◦XORwkin−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
∆
M2 ·∆‖M1 ·∆
)
= 1, (32)
Pr
(
M4 ·∆‖M3 ·∆
XORwkout◦Ψ
f4
γ4(k)
◦Ψf3
γ3(k)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
∆
∇3‖∇4
)
= 1, (33)
where wkin = w0(k)‖w1(k), wkout = w2(k)‖w3(k), and
XORwk(W ) = wk ⊕W .
Therefore, for the two forward queries, if we assume(
Ψf2γ2(k) ◦Ψ
f1
γ1(k)
)(
wkin ⊕ (L‖R)
)
= X‖Y, (34)
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then by (32) it holds(
Ψf2
γ2(k∆)
◦Ψf1
γ1(k∆)
)(
wk∆in ⊕ (L⊕∇1‖R⊕∇2)
)
=X ⊕M2 ·∆‖Y ⊕M1 ·∆ (35)
for wk∆in = w0(k∆)‖w1(k∆). Eq. (34) and (35) also mean(
Ψf4γ4(k) ◦Ψ
f3
γ3(k)
)−1(
wkout ⊕ (S‖T )
)
= X‖Y,(
Ψf4γ4(k∆) ◦Ψ
f3
γ3(k∆)
)−1(
wk∆out ⊕ (S′‖T ′)
)
=X ⊕M2 ·∆‖Y ⊕M1 ·∆,
where wk∆out = w2(k∆)‖w3(k∆), and S, T, S′, T ′ are the
values appeared during the attack. Consider the two backward
queries, and assume that
X ′′‖Y ′′ = (Ψf4γ4(k∆) ◦Ψf3γ3(k∆))−1(wk∆out ⊕ (S′′‖T ′′)),
X ′′′‖Y ′′′ = (Ψf4γ4(k) ◦Ψf3γ3(k))−1(wkout ⊕ (S′′′‖T ′′′)).
By (33) we have
X ′′‖Y ′′ = X ⊕M4 ·∆‖Y ⊕M3 ·∆,
X ′′′‖Y ′′′ = X ⊕M2 ·∆⊕M4 ·∆‖Y ⊕M1 ·∆⊕M3 ·∆,
thus (X ′′‖Y ′′) ⊕ (X ′′′‖Y ′′′) = M2 ·∆‖M1 ·∆. By this and
(32) it can be seen (L′′‖R′′)⊕ (L′′′‖R′′′) = ∇1‖∇2.
On the other hand, when interacting with RK[ICk], the
last response L′′′‖R′′′ is uniform in {0, 1}2n\{LR}. So
PrIC[(L
′′‖R′′) ⊕ (L′′′‖R′′′) = (∇1‖∇2)] = 1N2−1 , which is
also the probability that the distinguisher outputs 1 in the ideal
world. Thus the claimed bound.
2) (In)security for 5 Rounds: We first exhibit an attack
with only one additional assumption on the key-schedule: it’s
easy to derive ∆ 6= 0 such that M1 · ∆ = M5 · ∆. This
is possible: e.g., if γ1 and γ5 are bit-permutations, then for
∆ = 0xFF . . . FF it holds M1 ·∆ = M5 ·∆ = 0xFF . . . FF.
From a cryptanalytic point of view, the core trick is: in
the boomerang attack setting, under some conditions, Feistel
schemes allow a Feistel boomerang switch trick [24], which
enables penetrating one more round. Applying this trick to
the 4-round related-key boomerang mentioned before yields a
5-round related-key boomerang distinguisher. Formally,
Theorem 4 There exists a (0, 4)-distinguisher D such that,
for any 5 functions
−→
f = (f1, f2, f3, f4, f5) and any 5-round
affine key-schedule (w, γ) where w and γ are as defined in
Eq. (5) and (6) and satisfy that it’s easy to derive ∆ 6= 0 such
that M1 ·∆ = M5 ·∆, it holds
Adv⊕-rka
KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ)
k
(D) ≥ 1− 1
N2 − 1 .
Proof: The distinguisher D proceeds as:
(1) derive a difference ∆ 6= 0 such that M1 ·∆ = M5 ·∆;
(2) choose two arbitrary values L,R ∈ {0, 1}n, and let
∇1 = (M (w)0 ⊕ M2) · ∆, ∇2 = (M (w)1 ⊕ M1) · ∆,
∇3 = (M5 ⊕ M (w)2 ) · ∆, and ∇4 = (M4 ⊕ M (w)3 ) ·
∆. Make two queries RK[Ek](0, L‖R) → S‖T and
RK[Ek](∆, L⊕∇1‖R⊕∇2)→ S′‖T ′;
(3) query RK[Ek]−1(∆, S ⊕ ∇3‖T ⊕ ∇4) → L′′‖R′′ and
RK[Ek]−1(0, S′ ⊕∇3‖T ′ ⊕∇4)→ L′′′‖R′′′;
(4) if (L′′‖R′′) ⊕ (L′′′‖R′′′) = ∇1‖∇2 then output 1 to
indicate E is KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ), and otherwise 0: E is IC.
We show the output is always 1 when E is KAFw
−→
f ,(w,γ).
Assume that wkin = w0(k)‖w1(k), and(
Ψf2γ2(k) ◦Ψ
f1
γ1(k)
)(
wkin ⊕ (L‖R)
)
= X‖Y,
then by (32) we have(
Ψf2γ2(k∆) ◦Ψ
f1
γ1(k∆)
)(
wk∆in ⊕ (L⊕∇1‖R⊕∇2)
)
=X ⊕M2 ·∆‖Y ⊕M1 ·∆
for k∆ = k ⊕ ∆ and wk∆in = w0(k∆)‖w1(k∆). Computing
one more round, we obtain(
Ψf3γ3(k) ◦Ψ
f2
γ2(k)
◦Ψf1γ1(k)
)(
wkin ⊕ (L‖R)
)
=Y ‖X ⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕ Y ) (36)
and(
Ψf3γ3(k∆) ◦Ψ
f2
γ2(k∆)
◦Ψf1γ1(k∆)
)(
wk∆in ⊕ (L⊕∇1‖R⊕∇2)
)
=Y ⊕M1 ·∆‖X ⊕M2 ·∆
⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕M3 ·∆⊕ Y ⊕M1 ·∆). (37)
The differential Eq. (33) should be adapted to 5 rounds:
Pr
(
M5 ·∆‖M4 ·∆
XORwkout◦Ψ
f5
γ5(k)
◦Ψf4
γ4(k)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
∆
∇3‖∇4
)
= 1, (38)
where wkout = w2(k)‖w3(k). By this and Eq. (36) and (37),
if we assume wk∆out = w2(k∆)‖w3(k∆),
Y ′′‖Z′′ =(Ψf5γ5(k∆) ◦Ψf4γ4(k∆))−1(wk∆out ⊕ (S ⊕∇3‖T ⊕∇4)),
X ′′‖Y ′′ =(Ψf3γ3(k∆))−1(Y ′′‖Z′′),
Y ′′′‖Z′′′ =(Ψf5γ5(k) ◦Ψf4γ4(k))−1(wkout ⊕ (S′ ⊕∇3‖T ′ ⊕∇4)),
X ′′′‖Y ′′′ =(Ψf3γ3(k))−1(Y ′′′‖Z′′′),
then it necessarily holds
Y ′′‖Z ′′ = Y ⊕M5 ·∆‖X ⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕ Y )⊕M4 ·∆,
X ′′ = X ⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕ Y )⊕M4 ·∆
⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕M3 ·∆⊕ Y ⊕M5 ·∆),
Y ′′′‖Z ′′′ = Y ⊕M1 ·∆⊕M5 ·∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Y, since M1·∆=M5·∆
‖X ⊕M2 ·∆
⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕M3 ·∆⊕ Y ⊕M1 ·∆)⊕M4 ·∆,
X ′′′ = X ⊕M2 ·∆⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕M3 ·∆⊕ Y ⊕M1 ·∆)
⊕M4 ·∆⊕ f3(γ3(k)⊕ Y ).
Now since M5 ·∆ = M1 ·∆, it can be seen
(X ′′‖Y ′′)⊕ (X ′′′‖Y ′′′) = M2 ·∆‖M5 ·∆ = M2 ·∆‖M1 ·∆,
which further indicates (L′′‖R′′) ⊕ (L′′′‖R′′′) = ∇1‖∇2 by
Eq. (32).
We’ve proved that the probability of outputting 1 in the
ideal world is 1/(N2 − 1) in the proof of Theorem 3. Thus
the claim.
Note that we did not assume ∃∆ 6= 0 such that M1 ·∆ 6=
M3 ·∆ or M3 ·∆ 6= M5 ·∆. In this case, the scheme suffers
from simpler complementation-based attacks, see Appendix B.
On the other hand, if there is no ∆ 6= 0 such that M1 ·∆ =
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M5 · ∆, then the above attack is not effective. In fact, we
conjecture security in this (latter) case, but the proof would be
a significantly different from those in this paper. Moreover, it’s
inferior in the sense that it requires additional assumptions on
the key-schedule (i.e. ∀∆ 6= 0,M1 ·∆ 6= M5 ·∆). We thereby
leave it for future, and revert to 6 rounds.
B. Security for 6 Rounds when f=P
We first present the conditions on the key-schedule (w, γ)
that are sufficient for security proof for 6-round KAFwf,(w,γ).
Definition 3 (Good Affine Key-Schedule for 6 Rounds)
We say that a 6-round key-schedule (w, γ), for which
w = (w0, w1, w2, w3), wi(k) = M
(w)
i · k ⊕ C(w)i ,
γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5, γ6), and γi(k) = Mi · k ⊕ Ci,
is good, if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) ϕ1, ϕ6, and ϕ1⊕ϕ6 are bijective maps of {0, 1}n, where
ϕ1(k) = w1(k)⊕ γ1(k), ϕ6(k) = w2(k)⊕ γ6(k);
(2) for any ∆ 6= 0, M1 ·∆ 6= M3 ·∆, M4 ·∆ 6= M6 ·∆.
The 1st condition resembles those in Definition 1. On the other
hand, the 2nd condition prevents the complementing attacks.
One could see Appendix B for further insights.
Theorem 5 When qf + 4qe ≤ N/2, for the 6-round, random
permutation-based KAFwP,(w,γ) cipher with a good key-
schedule (w, γ) as specified in Definition 3, it holds
Adv⊕-rka
KAFwP,(w,γ)k
(qf , qe) ≤ 14qeqf + 57q
2
e + 4qe
N
.
Proof. The proof strategy is similar to that described
in section III-B1. For any function transcript Qf =
((x1, y1), . . . , (xqf , yqf )), we define X (τ) and Y(τ) as the
sets {x1, . . . , xqf } and {y1, . . . , yqf }. We also define 16
functions for any tuple t = (∆, LR, ST ) in QE and any
function f (f = P ∈ P(n) in this subsection):
• x1(t) = ϕ1(k ⊕∆)⊕R,
• y1(t, f) = f(x1(t)),
• X(t, f) = L⊕ w0(k ⊕∆)⊕ y1(t, f),
• x2(t, f) = γ2(k ⊕∆)⊕X(t, f),
• y2(t, f) = f(x2(t, f)),
• Y (t, f) = R⊕ w1(k ⊕∆)⊕ y2(t, f),
• x3(t, f) = γ3(k ⊕∆)⊕ Y (t, f),
• y3(t, f) = X(t, f)⊕ Z(t, f),
• Z(t, f) = S ⊕ w2(k ⊕∆)⊕ y5(t, f),
• x4(t, f) = γ4(k ⊕∆)⊕ Z(t, f),
• y4(t, f) = Y (t, f)⊕A(t, f),
• A(t, f) = T ⊕ w3(k ⊕∆)⊕ y6(t, f),
• x5(t, f) = γ5(k ⊕∆)⊕A(t, f),
• y5(t, f) = f(x5(t, f)),
• x6(t) = ϕ6(k ⊕∆)⊕ S,
• y6(t, f) = f(x6(t)).
Bad Transcripts are then defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Bad Transcripts for 6-Round KAFwP,(w,γ))
An attainable transcript τ = (QE ,QP , k) is bad, if at least
one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
• (B-1) ∃t ∈ QE : x1(t) ∈ X (τ) or x6(t) ∈ X (τ);
• (B-2) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE : x1(t) = x6(t′);
• (B-3) there exist two queries t = (∆, LR, ST ) and t′ =
(∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) in QE such that ∆ 6= ∆′, and R⊕R′ =
(M
(w)
1 ⊕M1) · (∆⊕∆′) and S ⊕ S′ = (M6 ⊕M (w)2 ) ·
(∆⊕∆′).
Otherwise we say τ is good. Denote by Tbad the set of bad
transcripts.
Recall that
ϕ1(k) = w1(k)⊕ γ1(k) = M (w)1 · k ⊕ C(w)1 ⊕M1 · k ⊕ C1, and
ϕ6(k) = w2(k)⊕ γ6(k) = M (w)2 · k ⊕ C(w)2 ⊕M6 · k ⊕ C6.
Since both ϕ1 and ϕ6 are bijective maps of Fn2 , Pr[(B-1)] ≤
2qeqf
N is obvious. On the other hand, since ϕ1 ⊕ ϕ6 is
also bijective, for each choice of t = (∆, LR, ST ) and
t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) it holds
Pr[x1(t) = x6(t
′)]
= Pr
[
(M
(w)
1 ⊕M1) · (k∆)⊕ C(w)1 ⊕ C1 ⊕R
Pr[] = (M
(w)
2 ⊕M6) · (k∆)⊕ (M (w)2 ⊕M6) · (∆⊕∆′)
⊕ C(w)2 ⊕ C6 ⊕ S′
]
= Pr
[
(ϕ1 ⊕ ϕ6)(k∆) = (M (w)2 ⊕M6) · (∆⊕∆′)⊕R⊕ S′
]
=
1
N
.
Therefore, Pr[(B-2)] ≤ q2eN . Ultimately, for (B-3), for any such
two queries (∆, LR, ST ) and (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′), following an
analysis similar to (B-4) in Definition 2, the probability that
R⊕R′ = (M (w)1 ⊕M1)·(∆⊕∆′) and S⊕S′ = (M6⊕M (w)2 )·
(∆⊕∆′) are both fulfilled is at most 2/N when qe ≤ N . Thus
Pr[(B-3)] ≤ q2eN . In all,
Pr[Tid ∈ Tbad] ≤ 2qeqf + 2q
2
e
N
. (39)
Ratio Prre(τ)/Prid(τ) for Good τ . We define two bad
predicates on P in turn. Then, using an argument similar to
subsection III-B3, we show that if neither of the two predicates
holds, then Pr[KAFwP,(w,γ)k ` QE ] ≥ 1N2qe . These cinch the
bounds.
First Bad Predicate. For any P ` QP , the predicate B1(P )
holds, if any of the following conditions is fulfilled:
• (C-11) there exist t = (∆, LR, ST ) and t′ =
(∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) in QE such that x1(t) 6= x1(t′), yet
x2(t, P ) = x2(t
′, P ) or X(t, P ) ⊕ X(t′, P ) = M6 ·
(∆⊕∆′);
• (C-12) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE (could be t = t′): x2(t, P ) ∈ X (τ),
or x2(t, P ) = x1(t′), or x2(t, P ) = x6(t′);
• (C-13) there exist t = (∆, LR, ST ) and t′ =
(∆′, L′R′, S′T ′) in QE such that x6(t) 6= x6(t′), yet
x5(t, P ) = x5(t
′, P ) or A(t, P )⊕A(t′, P ) = M1 · (∆⊕
∆′);
• (C-14) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE (could be t = t′): x5(t, P ) ∈ X (τ),
or x5(t, P ) ∈
{
x1(t
′), x2(t′, P ), x6(t′)
}
;
• (C-15) there exists a query t = (∆, LR, ST ) in QE such
that
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– L⊕ w0(k ⊕∆)⊕ S ⊕ w2(k ⊕∆) = P (x1(t)), or
– R⊕ w1(k ⊕∆)⊕ T ⊕ w3(k ⊕∆) = P (x6(t)).
For (C-11), for each pair (t, t′) with t = (∆, LR, ST ) and
t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′), the event x2(t, P ) = x2(t′, P ) is
equivalent to X(t, P ) ⊕ X(t′, P ) = M2 · (∆ ⊕ ∆′), which
is further equivalent to
L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ P (x1(t))
=L′ ⊕ w0(k∆′)⊕ P (x1(t′))⊕M2 · (∆⊕∆′). (40)
Since τ is good, it holds x1(t) /∈ X (τ). Conditioned on
P ` QP and the ≤ 2qe function values
{
P (xi(t
′)) | t′ ∈
QE , i = 1, 6, xi(t′) 6= x1(t)
}
(which includes P (x1(t′))
since x1(t) 6= x1(t′)), P (x1(t)) is uniform in at least
N − qf − 2qe possibilities. Therefore, for each pair (t, t′),
Pr[x2(t, P ) = x2(t
′, P )] = Pr[Eq. (40)] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe . For
the same reason, Pr[X(t, P )⊕X(t′, P ) = M6 · (∆⊕∆′)] ≤
1
N−qf−2qe . Thus
Pr[(C-11)] ≤
(
qe
2
)
· 2
N − qf − 2qe ≤
q2e
N − qf − 2qe .
Then, the value x2(t, P ) relies on P (x1(t)), and is thus
uniform. Since the values in X (τ) and the values of the form
x1(t
′) and x6(t′) are all independent from P (x1(t)), it holds
Pr[(C-12)] ≤ qeqf
N − qf − 2qe+
qe · 2qe
N − qf − 2qe =
qe(qf + 2qe)
N − qf − 2qe .
For (C-13) the analysis is similar to (C-11) by symmetry,
yielding the same bound
Pr[(C-13)] ≤
(
qe
2
)
· 2
N − qf − 2qe ≤
q2e
N − qf − 2qe .
Similarly, the main claim in (C-14) can be bounded:
Pr[∃t, t′ : x5(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or x5(t, P ) = x1(t′) or x5(t, P ) = x6(t′)]
≤ qe(qf + 2qe)
N − qf − 2qe
The remaining subevent of (C-14), i.e. ∃t, t′ : x5(t, P ) =
x2(t
′, P ), is equivalent to
γ5(k ⊕∆)⊕ T ⊕ w3(k ⊕∆)⊕ P (x6(t))
=γ2(k ⊕∆′)⊕ L′ ⊕ w0(k ⊕∆′)⊕ P (x1(t′)). (41)
By ¬(B-2), x1(t′) 6= x6(t), thus P (x1(t′))—as well as the
entire right hand side—is random conditioned on P (x6(t)).
Thus Pr[∃t, t′ : Eq. (41) holds] ≤ q2eN−qf−2qe , and
Pr[(C-14)] ≤ qe(qf + 2qe)
N − qf − 2qe +
q2e
N − qf − 2qe ≤
qe(qf + 3qe)
N − qf − 2qe .
Finally, since both P (x1(t)) and P (x6(t)) are uniform for
each t, we immediately obtain Pr[(C-15)] ≤ 2qeN−qf−2qe .
Summing over Pr[(C-11)] to Pr[(C-15)], we reach
Pr[P
$←− P(n) : B1(P ) | P ` QP ] ≤ 2qeqf + 7q
2
e + 2qe
N − qf − 2qe . (42)
Second Bad Predicate. We then consider a random permu-
tation P such that P ` QP and ¬B1(P ). For this P , the
predicate B2(P ) holds if any of the following conditions is
fulfilled:
• (C-21) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE : x2(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ), yet either
x3(t, P ) = x3(t
′, P ) or y4(t, P ) = y4(t′, P );
• (C-22) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE (could be t = t′):
– x3(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or y4(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ), or
– x3(t, P ) ∈
{
x1(t
′), x2(t′, P ), x5(t′, P ), x6(t′)
}
, or
– y4(t, P ) ∈
{
y1(t
′, P ), y2(t′, P ), y5(t′, P ), y6(t′, P )
}
.
• (C-23) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE : x5(t, P ) 6= x5(t′, P ), yet either
x4(t, P ) = x4(t
′, P ) or y3(t, P ) = y3(t′, P );
• (C-24) ∃t, t′ ∈ QE (could be t = t′):
– x4(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or y3(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ), or
– x4(t, P ) ∈
{
x1(t
′), x2(t′, P ), x3(t′, P ), x5(t′, P ),
x6(t
′)
}
, or
– y3(t, P ) ∈
{
y1(t
′, P ), y2(t′, P ), y4(t′, P ), y5(t′, P ),
y6(t
′, P )
}
.
First, for each t = (∆, LR, ST ), conditioned on P ` QP and
the ≤ 4qe values
{P (xi(t′)), P (xj(t′, P )),
∣∣ t′ ∈ QE , i = 1, 6, j = 2, 5,
xj(t
′, P ) 6= x2(t, P )},
the value y2(t, P ) = P (x2(t, P )) remains uniform in at least
N−qf −4qe possibilities. So Y (t, P ), x3(t, P ), and y4(t, P )
derived from y2(t, P ) are all uniform. These show:
Pr[(C-21)] ≤
(
qe
2
)
· 2
N − qf − 4qe ≤
q2e
N − qf − 4qe ,
Pr[∃t : x3(t, P ) ∈ X (τ)] ≤ qeqf
N − qf − 4qe , (43)
Pr[∃t, t′ : x3(t, P ) ∈
{
x1(t
′), x6(t
′)
}
] ≤ qe · 2qe
N − qf − 4qe , (44)
Pr[∃t : y4(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ)] ≤ qeqf
N − qf − 4qe . (45)
Second, for cleanness let k∆ = k ⊕∆ and k∆′ = k ⊕∆′,
then
Pr[∃t, t′ : x3(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )]
= Pr[∃t, t′ : γ3(k∆)⊕R⊕ w1(k∆)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CON1, will be used below
⊕P (x2(t, P ))
= γ2(k∆′)⊕ L′ ⊕ w0(k∆′)⊕ P (x1(t′))].
By ¬(C-12), x2(t, P ) 6= x1(t′), x2(t, P ) 6= x6(t′),
x2(t, P ) 6= x6(t), so for the involved equality the right hand
side is random conditioned on the left hand side. Therefore,
Pr[∃t, t′ : x3(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )] ≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe . (46)
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For similar reasons,
Pr[∃t, t′ : x3(t, P ) = x5(t′, P )]
= Pr[∃t, t′ : CON1 ⊕ P (x2(t, P ))
= γ5(k∆′)⊕ T ′ ⊕ w3(k∆′)⊕ P (x6(t′))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe , (47)
Pr
[∃t, t′ : y4(t, P ) = y1(t′, P )]
= Pr
[∃t, t′ : (R⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ P (x2(t, P )))
⊕ (T ⊕ w3(k∆)⊕ P (x6(t))) = P (x1(t′))]
= Pr
[∃t, t′ : P (x2(t, P )) = R⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ T
⊕ w3(k∆)⊕ P (x6(t))⊕ P (x1(t′))
]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe . (48)
Pr
[∃t, t′ : y4(t, P ) = y6(t′, P )]
= Pr
[∃t, t′ : P (x2(t, P )) = R⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ T
⊕ w3(k∆)⊕ P (x6(t))⊕ P (x6(t′))
]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe . (49)
Furthermore, by ¬(C-14), ∀t, t′, x2(t, P ) 6= x5(t′, P ). So
Pr[∃t, t′ : y4(t, P ) = y5(t′, P )]
= Pr[∃t, t′ : R⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ P (x2(t, P ))⊕ T ⊕ w3(k∆)
⊕ P (x6(t)) = P (x5(t′, P ))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe . (50)
Finally, for a pair (t, t′), y4(t, P ) = y2(t′, P ) would imply
R⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ P (x2(t, P ))⊕ T ⊕ w3(k∆)⊕ P (x6(t))
=P (x2(t
′, P )). (51)
Then,
(1) If x2(t, P ) = x2(t′, P ), then for t = (∆, LR, ST ) it
holds
R⊕ w1(k ⊕∆)⊕ T ⊕ w3(k ⊕∆) = P (x6(t)),
contradicting ¬(C-15);
(2) Otherwise, P (x2(t′, P )) is random conditioned on the
left hand side of (51), thus Pr[Eq. (51)] ≤ 1N−qf−4qe .
As the number of pairs (t, t′) is at most q2e ,
Pr[∃t, t′ : y4(t, P ) = y2(t′, P )] ≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe . (52)
Summing over (43)-(52), we obtain
Pr[(C-22)] ≤ 2qe(qf + 4qe)
N − qf − 4qe .
Third, symmetrically, for each t = (∆, LR, ST ) ∈ QE ,
the value y5(t, P ) = P (x5(t, P )) remains random. So
Z(t, P ), x4(t, P ), and y3(t, P ) are all uniform. Therefore,
Pr[(C-23)] ≤ q2eN−qf−4qe . In addition, in a similar vein to the
analysis of (C-22), we have
• Pr[∃t : x4(t, P ) ∈ X (τ) or y3(t, P ) ∈ Y(τ)] ≤
2qeqf
N−qf−4qe ;
• Pr[∃t, t′ : x4(t, P ) = x1(t′) or x4(t, P ) = x6(t′)] ≤
2q2e
N−qf−4qe .
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t′, x5(t, P ) 6= x1(t′). So: (k∆ = k ⊕ ∆,
k∆′ = k ⊕∆′)
Pr[∃t, t′ : x4(t, P ) = x2(t′, P )]
= Pr[γ4(k∆)⊕ S ⊕ w2(k∆)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CON2, will be used below
⊕P (x5(t, P ))
= γ2(k∆′)⊕ L′ ⊕ w0(k∆′)⊕ P (x1(t′))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe , and
Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, P ) = y1(t′, P )]
= Pr[
(
L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ P (x1(t))
)⊕ (S ⊕ w2(k∆)
⊕ P (x5(t, P ))
)
= P (x1(t
′))]
= Pr
[
P (x5(t, P )) = L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ S ⊕ w2(k∆)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CON3, will be used later
⊕ P (x1(t))⊕ P (x1(t′))
]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe .
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t′, x5(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ). So
Pr[∃t, t′ : x4(t, P ) = x3(t′, P )]
= Pr[CON2 ⊕ P (x5(t, P ))
= γ3(k∆′)⊕R′ ⊕ w1(k∆′)⊕ P (x2(t′, P ))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe , and
Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, P ) = y2(t′, P )]
= Pr[P (x5(t, P )) = CON3 ⊕ P (x1(t))⊕ P (x2(t′, P ))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe .
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t′, x5(t, P ) 6= x6(t′). So
Pr[∃t, t′ : x4(t, P ) = x5(t′, P )]
= Pr[CON2 ⊕ P (x5(t, P ))
= γ5(k∆′)⊕ T ′ ⊕ w3(k∆′)⊕ P (x6(t′))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe , and
Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, P ) = y6(t′, P )]
= Pr[P (x5(t, P )) = CON3 ⊕ P (x1(t))⊕ P (x6(t′))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe .
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t′, x5(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ) and x5(t, P ) 6=
x6(t
′). So
Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, P ) = y4(t′, P )]
= Pr[P (x5(t, F )) = CON3 ⊕ P (x1(t))⊕
(
R′ ⊕ w1(k∆′)
⊕ P (x2(t′, P ))
)⊕ (T ′ ⊕ w3(k∆′)⊕ P (x6(t′)))]
≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe
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Finally consider Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, P ) = y5(t′, P )]. If it
happens then we have
L⊕ w0(k∆)⊕ P (x1(t))⊕ S ⊕ w2(k∆)⊕ P (x5(t, P ))
=P (x5(t
′, P )). (53)
If x5(t, P ) 6= x5(t′, P ) then the right hand side of (53) is
random given P (x5(t, P )) and Pr[Eq. (53)] ≤ 1N−qf−2qe ;
otherwise we reach L⊕w0(k⊕∆)⊕S⊕w2(k⊕∆) = P (x1(t)),
contradicting ¬(C-15). So
Pr[∃t, t′ : y3(t, P ) = y5(t′, P )] ≤ q
2
e
N − qf − 2qe . (54)
In all, we have
Pr[(C-24)] ≤ 2qe(qf + 5qe)
N − qf − 4qe ,
and further
Pr[P
$←− P(n) : B2(P ) | P ` QP ∧ ¬B1(P )] ≤
4qeqf + 20q
2
e
N − qf − 4qe
. (55)
Define B(P ) = B1(P )∨B2(P ). Then Eq. (42) and (55) yield
Pr[P
$←− P(n) : B(P ) | P ` QP ] ≤ 6qeqf + 27q
2
e + 2qe
N − qf − 4qe . (56)
2qe Equations. Similarly to the 4-round case, we show
PrP [RK[KAFw
P,(w,γ)
k ] ` QE | P ` QP ∧ ¬B(P )] ≥
1
N2qe
.
Here ¬B(P ) indicates
• ∀t ∈ QE , i = 3, 4, xi(t, P ) /∈ X (τ), yi(t, P ) /∈ Y(τ),
and
• {xi(t, P )
∣∣ i = 3, 4, t ∈ QE} ∩ {xj(t, P ) ∣∣ j =
1, 2, 5, 6, t ∈ QE} = ∅, and
• {yi(t, P )
∣∣ i = 3, 4, t ∈ QE} ∩ {yj(t, P ) ∣∣ j =
1, 2, 5, 6, t ∈ QE} = ∅, and
• ∀t, t′ ∈ QE , x3(t, P ) 6= x4(t′, P ), y3(t, P ) 6= y4(t′, P ).
By an analysis similar to subsection III-B3, we only need to
show∣∣∣{xi(t, P ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{yi(t, P ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣∣ = qe
for i = 3, 4. For this, we argue t 6= t′ ⇒ x3(t, P ) 6=
x3(t
′, P ) and y4(t, P ) 6= y4(t′, P ) for any t = (∆, LR, ST )
and t′ = (∆′, L′R′, S′T ′):
Case 1: t and t′ are such that R⊕R′ = (M (w)1 ⊕M1)·(∆⊕∆′)
and L ⊕ L′ = (M (w)0 ⊕M2) · (∆ ⊕ ∆′). By the definition
of ϕ0, ϕ1, γ1, and γ2, the former implies ϕ1(k ⊕ ∆) ⊕ R =
ϕ1(k ⊕ ∆′) ⊕ R′, i.e. x1(t) = x1(t′); and the latter further
implies
γ2(k ⊕∆)⊕ L⊕ w0(k ⊕∆)⊕ P (x1(t))
=γ2(k ⊕∆′)⊕ L′ ⊕ w0(k ⊕∆′)⊕ P (x1(t)),
i.e. x2(t, P ) = x2(t′, P ). And it necessarily be ∆ 6= ∆′,
otherwise ∆ ⊕ ∆′ = 0 and thus R = R′ and L = L′ and
t = t′, a contradiction. Then:
• x3(t, P ) 6= x3(t′, P ), otherwise it implies
γ3(k ⊕∆)⊕R⊕ w1(k ⊕∆)⊕ P (x2(t, P ))
=γ3(k ⊕∆′)⊕R′ ⊕ w1(k ⊕∆′)⊕ P (x2(t′, P )).
Then we have
γ3(k ⊕∆)⊕ γ3(k ⊕∆′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M3·∆⊕M3·∆′
= R⊕R′ ⊕M (w)1 · (∆⊕∆′)
= M1 · (∆⊕∆′),
thus M3 · (∆ ⊕ ∆′) = M1 · (∆ ⊕ ∆′), contradicting
condition (2) in Definition 3 (good key-schedule for 6
rounds);
• y4(t, P ) 6= y4(t′, P ). Because the assumption on R⊕R′
implies S ⊕ S′ 6= (M6 ⊕ M (w)2 ) · (∆ ⊕ ∆′) by ¬(B-
3). By ¬(C-13) we further have A(t, P ) ⊕ A(t′, P ) 6=
M1 · (∆⊕∆′). However, in this case, it necessarily be
Y (t, P )⊕ Y (t′, P ) = R⊕R′ ⊕ w1(k∆)⊕ w1(k∆′)
= M1 · (∆⊕∆′).
Therefore, we must have Y (t, P )⊕Y (t′, P ) 6= A(t, P )⊕
A(t′, P ), i.e. y4(t, P ) 6= y4(t′, P );
Case 2: for (t, t′), x1(t) = x1(t′), yet x2(t, P ) 6= x2(t′, P ).
Then by ¬(C-21) we immediately have x3(t, P ) 6= x3(t′, P )
and y4(t, P ) 6= y4(t′, P );
Case 3: for (t, t′), x1(t) 6= x1(t′). This implies x2(t, P ) 6=
x2(t
′, P ) by ¬(C-11), and further x3(t, P ) 6= x3(t′, P ) and
y4(t, P ) 6= y4(t′, P ) by ¬(C-21).
So
∣∣{x3(t, P ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣ = ∣∣{y4(t, P ) ∣∣ t ∈ QE}∣∣ = qe.
The argument for x4(t, P ) and y3(t, P ) is similar by symme-
try (utilizing the property M4 ·∆ 6= M6 ·∆ for ∆ 6= 0 given
in Definition 3 and the condition ¬(C-13)). By all the above
discussion and (56), for any good τ , when qf + 4qe ≤ N/2,
via a counting similar to that in the previous section we reach
Prre(τ)
Prid(τ)
≥Pr[P ` QP ]
N2qe
(
1− 6qeqf + 27q
2
e + 2qe
N − qf − 4qe
)/
Pr[P ` QP ]
(N2 − qe)qe
≥
(
1− 12qeqf + 54q
2
e + 4qe
N
)(
N2 − qe
N2
)qe
≥1− 12qeqf + 55q
2
e + 4qe
N
.
Gathering this and (39) and Lemma 1 yields Theorem 5.
C. When f=F is a Random Function
For the proof, we need the following modifications on the
proof for 6-round KAFwP,(w,γ):
(1) in Definition 4 (bad transcripts), (B-3) is only used
for proving ∀(t, t′) : y3(t, F ) 6= y3(t′, F ), y4(t, F ) 6=
y4(t
′, F ), cf. page 17. We thus drop it and obtain
Pr[Tid ∈ Tbad] ≤ 2qeqf + q
2
e
N
; (57)
(2) in the definition of B1(F ), the two conditions X(t, F )⊕
X(t′, F ) = M6 · (∆ ⊕ ∆′) in (C-11) and A(t, F ) ⊕
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A(t′, F ) = M1 · (∆ ⊕ ∆′) in (C-13) are only used
for proving ∀(t, t′) : y3(t, F ) 6= y3(t′, F ), y4(t, F ) 6=
y4(t
′, F ), cf. page 17. In addition, (C-15) is only used
for proving ∀(t, t′) : y2(t, F ) 6= y4(t′, F ), y3(t, F ) 6=
y5(t
′, F ), cf. page 16. We thus drop them, which de-
creases Pr[B1(F )] to 2qeqf+6q
2
e
N ;
(3) in the definition of B2(F ), we drop
• y4(t, F ) = y4(t′, F ) in (C-21), and
• ∃t, t′ : y4(t, F ) ∈ Y(τ) or y4(t, F ) ∈ {y1(t′, F ),
y2(t
′, F ), y5(t′, F ), y6(t′, F )} in (C-22), and
• y3(t, F ) = y3(t′, F ) in (C-23), and
• ∃t, t′ : y3(t, F ) ∈ Y(τ) or y3(t, F ) ∈ {y1(t′, F ),
y2(t
′, F ), y4(t′, F ), y5(t′, F ), y6(t′, F )} in (C-24).
These decrease Pr[B2(F )] to 2qeqf+10q
2
e
N .
Therefore,
Prre(τ)
Prid(τ)
≥ 1− 4qeqf + 16q
2
e
N
− q
2
e
N2
. (58)
Gathering (57) and (58) gives rise to the following Theorem.
Theorem 6 For the 6-round, random function-based
KAFwF,(w,γ) cipher with a good key-schedule (w, γ) as
specified in Definition 3, it holds
Adv⊕-rka
KAFwF,(w,γ)k
(qf , qe) ≤ 6qeqf + 18q
2
e
N
.
V. DERIVING RESULTS ON KAF AND KAFV CIPHERS
A. Results on KAF
Since KAF ciphers are KAFw ciphers with no whitening
keys, results on the latter can be immediately transposed to
the former. In detail, denote by γ = (γ1, . . . , γt) a t-round
key-schedule of KAF, then with the function Ψfk defined by
Eq. (7) in section II, the t-round KAFf,γ cipher is defined as
KAFf,γk (W ) = Ψ
f
γt(k)
◦ . . . ◦Ψfγ1(k)(W ).
Setting ϕi = γi for i = 1, 4, 6 in Definitions 1 and 3 (good
key-schedules for KAFwf,(w,γ)) yields the corollary.
Corollary 1 A 4-round non-linear key-schedule γ =
(γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4) is good for KAF
f,γ , if ϕ1 = γ1 and ϕ4 = γ4
satisfy the uniformness and AXU conditions defined in Defini-
tion 1.
A 6-round affine key-schedule γ = (γ1, . . . , γ6), where
γi(k) = Mi · k ⊕ Ci, is good for KAFf,γ , if:
(1) γ1, γ6, and γ1 ⊕ γ6 are bijective maps of {0, 1}n, and
(2) for any ∆ 6= 0, M1 ·∆ 6= M3 ·∆, M4 ·∆ 6= M6 ·∆.
With such good key-schedules, 4- and 6-round idealized
KAFP,γ and KAFF,γ ensure the same security bounds as
described in Theorems 1, 2, 5, and 6.
For affine schedules, both Corollary 1 and Definition 3 require
the “inner” KDFs γ3 and γ4 to fulfill some conditions, i.e.
M1 · ∆ 6= M3 · ∆ and M4 · ∆ 6= M6 · ∆. This means for
KAF instances that suffer from ⊕-RKAs, adding whitening
keys derived by affine KDFs would probably not be beneficial
for RKA security (since the “inner” KDFs remain “bad”).
For example, consider the attempt to prevent DES from
the complementation property via using a DESX-like [76]
structure DESX∗k(M) = k⊕DESk′(k⊕M), where the 56-bit
DES key k′ are 56 bits chosen from the 64-bit master-key k.
It can be seen while DESX∗
k
(M) = DESX∗k(M) does not nec-
essarily hold, the DESX∗k(M) still suffers from a (less trivial)
complementation-based property DESX∗
k
(M) = DESX∗k(M).
B. Results on KAFv
The transition to KAFv is a bit more complicated. Formally,
KAFv relies on the following round transformation
Ψ˜fk(WL‖WR) = WR‖WL ⊕ f(WR)⊕ k. (59)
With this, a t-round KAFv needs t + 2 sub-keys. To make
a clear distinction from the notations for KAF, we denote by
γ∗ = (γ∗0 , γ
∗
1 , . . . , γ
∗
t , γ
∗
t+1) a t-round key-schedule for KAFv:
γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
t for the t round-keys, while γ
∗
0 and γ
∗
t+1 for the two
whitening keys. Then the entire KAFvf,γ
∗
variant is
KAFvf,γ
∗
k (W ) = (γ
∗
t+1(k)‖0)⊕ Ψ˜fγ∗t (k) ◦ . . . ◦ Ψ˜
f
γ∗1 (k)
(
(0‖γ∗0 (k))⊕W
)
.
For KAFvf,γ
∗
we have
Corollary 2 A 4-round non-linear key-schedule γ∗ =
(γ∗0 , . . . , γ
∗
5) is good for KAFv
f,γ∗ , if ϕ1 = γ∗0 and ϕ4 = γ
∗
5
satisfy the two conditions defined in Definition 1.
A 6-round affine key-schedule γ∗ = (γ∗0 , . . . , γ
∗
7), where
γ∗i (k) = M
∗
i · k ⊕ C∗i , is good for KAFvf,γ
∗
, if:
(1) γ∗0 , γ
∗
7 , and γ
∗
0 ⊕ γ∗7 are bijective maps of {0, 1}n, and
(2) for any ∆ 6= 0, M∗2 ·∆ 6= 0, M∗5 ·∆ 6= 0.
With such good key-schedules, 4- and 6-round idealized
KAFvP,γ
∗
and KAFvF,γ
∗
ensure the same security bounds
as described in Theorems 1, 2, 5, and 6.
Proof: For a t-round KAFv key-schedule γ∗, define a t-
round KAFw schedule (w, γ) as follows:
• γ2`+1 =
⊕`
i=0 γ
∗
2i, where ` = 0, . . . , b t−12 c, and
• γ2`+2 =
⊕`
i=0 γ
∗
2i+1, where ` = 0, . . . , b t−22 c, and
• w2 = γt⊕γ∗t+1, w3 = γt−1⊕γ∗t , while w0(k) = w1(k) =
0.
Then it can be seen a t-round KAFv with the key-schedule γ∗
is a KAFw instance with (w, γ), i.e.
KAFvf,γ
∗
k (W ) = KAFw
f,(w,γ)
k (W ). (60)
Concretely, the 4-round KAFvf,γ
∗
schedule (γ∗0 , . . . , γ
∗
5 ) cor-
responds to the 4-round KAFwf,(w,γ) schedule (w, γ) with
w0(k) = w1(k) = 0, γ1 = γ∗0 (thus ϕ1 = w1 ⊕ γ1 = γ∗0 ),
and ϕ4 = γ4 ⊕ w2 = γ∗5 . The first half of the corollary thus
follows from Definition 1.
The 6-round affine key-schedule γ∗ = (γ∗0 , . . . , γ
∗
7 ) cor-
responds to the 6-round affine schedule (w, γ), in which
ϕ1 = w1 ⊕ γ1 = γ∗0 , ϕ6 = γ6 ⊕ w2 = γ∗7 , and:
(1) γ1 ⊕ γ3 = γ∗2 , and thus M∗2 = M1 ⊕M3;
(2) γ4 ⊕ γ6 = γ∗5 , and thus M∗5 = M4 ⊕M6.
Therefore, the second half follows from Definition 3.
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We believe the requirements on schedules of KAFvf,γ
∗
are
more relaxed than those required by KAFf,γ (Corollary 1),
since its condition (2) only requires to carefully design γ2
and γ5, without considering the more complicated interactions
between different round-KDFs (comparing with the second
condition in Definition 3). In particular, when designing affine
key-schedules in practice, one tends to choose invertible ma-
trices for M0, . . . ,Mt+1 in order to ensure the largest possible
amount of entropy in the round-keys, e.g. the bit-permutation-
based key-schedules in DES. In this case, condition (2) is
naturally satisfied, yet the second condition in Definition 3
may not be satisfied! (And when M1 ·k and M3 ·k define two
bit-permutations, the latter condition is indeed violated since
M1 · ∆ = M3 · ∆ = ∆ for ∆ = 0xFF . . . FF. This matches
that DES is vulnerable to complementing attacks.)
Finally, we remark that whitening keys play a crucial role
in the transformation Eq. (60). This means KAFv—as well as
the Lucifer-like model—cannot be precisely captured by KAF,
the variant of KAFw without whitening keys.
VI. TOWARDS MINIMALISM
To maximize the efficiency of the resulted permutation
modes, we derive theoretically “minimal” constructions. We
focus on KAFP,γ as it’s of the most general interest, and it’s
wlog, since minimal KAFwP,(w,γ) and KAFvP,γ
∗
schemes can
be easily derived similarly.
First, for the 4-round KAFP,γ , γ1(k) = M1 ⊗ k ⊕ k3,
γ2(k) = γ3(k) = 0, and γ4(k) = M4 ⊗ k ⊕ k3 is a group of
good choices, where M1 6= M4 are two non-zero constants
in {0, 1}n, and ⊗ denotes multiplications taken over the finite
field F2n . With this choice, it can be seen the three parameters
mentioned in Definition 1 are such that δ1 ≤ 3/N , δ2 ≤ 2/N ,
and δ3 ≤ 2/N , and the concrete advantage bound is a classical
birthday one 14qeqf+31q
2
e+4qe
N .
Our choice of γ1 and γ4 is motivated by [77]. On the
other hand, since no requirement is placed on γ2 and γ3 (see
Corollary 1 or Definition 1), they are completely absent: this
matches the existing result that the two middle round-functions
of 4-round Feistel do not need to be secret/“protected” by
round-keys [78]. This KAFP,γ variant seems “minimal” in the
sense that removing any component harms security: reducing
rounds ruins CCA security, choosing M1 = M4 introduces
the weakness KAFP,γk (LR) = ST ⇔ KAFP,γk (TS) = RL and
allows trivially distinguishing, while reducing the non-linearity
of KDFs would introduce related-key differentials with higher
probability and compromise the concrete security.
Second, for 6-round KAFP,γ , using a linear orthomorphism
pi, the key-schedule k 7→ (k, 0, 0, 0, 0, pi(k)) is sufficient. It
may be quite hard to believe many carefully designed sophis-
ticated key-schedules (e.g. DES) are insufficient to prevent
complementing attacks, while such an exotic design should be
good. The reason is that the absence of the 3rd and 4th round-
keys incidently prevents the complementation properties.
We stress that the key-schedule instances with many
“blanks” mentioned here are for theoretically minimalism
rather than for general purpose Feistel ciphers. For the latter
purpose, one could (actually, should) “fill in the blanks”. For
example, using pi(kL‖kR) = kR‖kL ⊕ kR mentioned in the
Introduction, it can be seen k 7→ (k, k, pi(k), k, k, pi(k)) is a
good key-schedule for 6-round KAFP,γ .
1) A Tweakable KAC: Finally, in 4-round KAFwf,(w,γ),
we can set w1(k) = M1⊗ k⊕ k3 and w2(k) = M4⊗ k⊕ k3,
while omit all the other sub-keys. This results in a variant
of the 1-round tweakable KAC of [21], with the permutation
instantiated by a 4-round keyless Feistel network.
VII. CONCLUSION
We’ve studied provable security of key-alternating
Feistel/Feistel-2 variants against ⊕-induced related-key
attacks, which better model the reality of Feistel blockciphers.
Assuming key-schedules being non-linear or purely affine, we
identify (different) conditions on the key-schedules that are
sufficient for a birthday-type security up to 2n/2 queries. The
results and implications make a step towards understanding
the behaviors of existing different Feistel cipher structures,
and offer new insights.
APPENDIX A
LUCIFER-LIKE MODEL AND KAFV
The Lucifer-like model Luc also relies on the round trans-
formation Ψ˜fk in Eq. (59). With this, a t-round Luc model
built upon t round-functions f1, . . . , ft uses t round-keys
k1, . . . , kt, and is
Lucf1,...,ftk1,...,kt(W ) = Ψ˜
ft
γ∗t (k)
◦ . . . ◦ Ψ˜f1γ∗1 (k)(W ). (61)
From section V-B we know a (t–2)-round KAFv uses t − 2
round-functions f1, . . . , ft−2 and t sub-keys k1, . . . , kt:
KAFvf1,...,ft−2k1,...,kt (W ) = (kt‖0)⊕ Ψ˜
ft−2
kt−1 ◦ . . . ◦ Ψ˜
f1
k2
(
(0‖k1)⊕W
)
.
By these, it’s not hard to see when t ≥ 2,
Lucf1,...,ftk1,...,kt(W ) = Ψ˜
ft
0 ◦ KAFvf2,...,ft−1k1,...,kt ◦ Ψ˜
f1
0 (W ),
where Ψ˜f10 and Ψ˜
ft
0 are two keyless permutations that
can be freely evaluated by the adversary. It can be seen
within a large range, any CCA attack A on (t–2)-round
KAFv can be turned into a CCA attack A′ on t-round
Luc: whenever A queries RK[KAFvf2,...,ft−1k ](∆, LR),
A′ queries RK[Lucf1,...,ftk ](∆, (Ψ˜f10 )−1(LR)); whenever
A queries RK[KAFvf2,...,ft−1k ]−1(∆, ST ), A′ queries
RK[Lucf1,...,ftk ]
−1(∆, Ψ˜ft0 (ST )). The formal characterization
is out of the scope of this paper.
APPENDIX B
COMPLEMENTING ATTACKS
We don’t claim novelty for these attacks, see [36]. We just
include them to help understanding our provable results. We
focus on KAFw variants with key-schedules that do not satisfy
condition (2) in Definition 3. We first brief how to break more
than 4 rounds, then describe the attack against any number of
rounds for “bad enough” key-schedules.
On 5 Rounds. Consider a 5-round key-schedule (w, γ), where
w = (w0, w1, w2, w3) and γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5), and γ is
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such that M1 ·∆ = M3 ·∆ for a non-zero value ∆. Then there
exists a 1-round related-key differential for the 3rd round, i.e.
Pr
(
M2 ·∆‖M1 ·∆
Ψ
f3
γ3(k)−−−−→
∆
M1 ·∆‖M2 ·∆
)
= 1.
Concatenating this differential with the mentioned 2-round
related-key differential Eq. (32) gives a 3-round differential:
Pr
(
∇1‖∇2
Ψ
f3
γ3(k)
◦Ψf2
γ2(k)
◦Ψf1
γ1(k)
◦XORwkin−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
∆
M1 ·∆‖M2 ·∆
)
= 1,
where ∇1 = (M (w)0 ⊕M2) ·∆, ∇2 = (M (w)1 ⊕M1) ·∆, and
wkin = w0(k)‖w1(k). Further concatenating this differential
with the 2-round related-key differential Eq. (38) yields a
5-round related-key boomerang distinguisher, which allows
distinguishing 5 rounds with 4 queries.
On Any Rounds. Consider a 2t-round schedule (w, γ) with
w = (w0, w1, w2, w3) and γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γ2t), and γ
satisfies: it’s easy to derive ∆ 6= 0 such that
• ∆1 = M1 ·∆ = M3 ·∆ = M5 ·∆ = . . . = M2t−1 ·∆,
and
• ∆2 = M2 ·∆ = M4 ·∆ = M6 ·∆ = . . . = M2t ·∆.
Then it can be seen there exists related-key differentials with
any number of rounds:
Pr
(
∇1‖∇2
Ψ
f1
γ1(k)
◦XORwkin−−−−−−−−−−−→
∆
∆1‖∆2
Ψ
f2
γ2(k)−−−−→
∆
∆2‖∆1
Ψ
f3
γ3(k)−−−−→
∆
. . .
XORwkout◦Ψ
ft
γt(k)−−−−−−−−−−−→
∆
δ
)
= 1,
where ∇1 = (M (w)0 ⊕ M2) · ∆, ∇2 = (M (w)1 ⊕ M1) · ∆,
wkout = w2(k)‖w3(k), the output difference δ = ∆2⊕M (w)2 ·
∆‖∆1⊕M (w)3 ·∆ when t is even, and δ = ∆1⊕M (w)3 ·∆‖∆2⊕
M
(w)
2 ·∆ otherwise. This allows distinguishing any t rounds
with 2 queries. To save space we omit detailed descriptions of
these two (innovel) variants of complementing attacks.
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